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The following comments were written by students at Northwestern University School of Law.
Contributors to the present issue are Jeffrey M. Johnson, P. John Owen and Robert B. Keiter.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE RIGHT TO A VOLUNTARINESS HEARING
The United States Supreme Court, in its efforts
to provide adequate due process safeguards in
criminal cases for the accused, has carefully for-
mulated standards governing the admission of
confessions in evidence.' Whether or not the
defendant is afforded protection against an inad-
missible confession, however, depends upon the
procedure by which courts apply these standards.
In Jackson v. Denno the Supreme Court concluded
that certain types of procedural devices failed to
eliminate the possibility that a defendant will be
convicted on the basis of an involuntary con-
fession. The majority' in Jackson held that the
fourteenth amendment due process clause requires
that a defendant who objects to the use of his
confession at trial is entitled to a fair hearing and
a reliable determination of the voluntariness of
the confession.
4
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the
nature of a Jackson v. Denno hearing, and examine
the circumstances under which the federal courts
of appeals, in interpreting the rule in Jackson,
have afforded the defendant the right to a Jackson
v. Denno hearing.
BACKGROUND
Wigmore stated that the only principle involved
in the test for the admissibility of a confession is
"trustworthiness." 5 This principle originated in
the English common law courts' use of confessions.
Although at early common law all confessions
were admissible, regardless of how they were ob-
tained, the English courts soon developed ex-
clusionary rules concerning the admissibility of
coerced confessions. 6 The exclusionary rule most
I See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
2 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
3 Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the
Court. Dissenting were Justices Clark, Harian, and
Stewart. Mr. Justice Black dissented in part and con-
curred in part.
4 378 U.S. at 376-77.
53 J. WIGmORE, EvIDENcE § 822 (Chadbourn rev. ed.
1970).6 See id. § 818, at 292.
often quoted is from the case of Rex v. Warick-
shall:
[A] confession forced from the mind by the flattery
of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so ques-
tionable a shape when it is to be considered as the
evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given
it. ....
The United States Supreme Court followed this
common law "trustworthy" concept of volun-
tariness in federal cases,8 yet the Court was careful
not to base the exclusion of coerced confessions
on constitutional grounds until the landmark
case of Brown v. Mississippi.9 In Brown the Court
reversed a Mississippi murder conviction and
held that a conviction based upon a confession
obtained through violence and coercion violates
the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment ° The Court reasoned that because inter-
rogation of an accused is an integral part of the
process employed by the state in obtaining a
7 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K.B. 1783).
8 Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896) best
exemplified the use of the "trustworthiness" standard
by the Court. The Court held that "the true test of
admissibility is that the confession is made freely, vol-
untarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any
sort." Id. at 623. The standard adopted by the Wilson
Court, however, closely resembles the contemporary
due process standard of voluntariness. See note 12
infra. Furthermore, in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S.
532 (1897), a case decided immediately after Wilson,
the Court seemed to adopt an approach of intertwining
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
and the trustworthiness standard into one principle.
The Brain Court stated:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States,
whereever a question arises whether a confession is
incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is
controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States command-
ing that no person shall be compelled in any crim-
inal case to be a witness against himself.
Id. at 542. For a discussion of the failure of the Court to
abandon the trustworthiness standard in asserting this
new, constitutional basis for confession-rules, see De-
velopments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARv. L. Rxv.
935, 960-61 (1966).
9297 U.S. 278 (1936). In Brown v. Mississippi,
sheriff's deputies severely beat three black defendants
until they confessed to having murdered a white man.
10 Id. at 285-86.
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conviction, it is subject to the requirements of
fourteenth amendment due process."
The common law rule of trustworthiness, dis-
placed by a due process standard of fairness,"2
was explicitly rejected by the Court in Rogers v.
Richmond." In Rogers the Court reversed the
trial court's conviction because the judge had
examined the probable truth or falsity of the
confession to determine admissibility. The Court
held that the due process clause prohibited the
consideration of the confession's reliability as a
standard in determining its admissibility. 4 The
Court reiterated in Rogers the principle that a
conviction based on an involuntary confession
is unconstitutional:
[Not because such confessions are unlikely to be
true but because the methods used to extract them
offend an underlying principle in the enforcement
of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial
and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which
the state must establish guilt by evidence inde-
pendently secured and may not by coercion prove
its charge against an accused out of his own
mouth."
Thus, although a confession may be trustworthy,
the protection of the individual from coercive
police practices outweighs the state's desire for a
confession.16
Id.
2 The constitutional guarantee of the inadmissibility
of coerced confessions was reaffirmed in Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). The Supreme Court
there stated:
The aim of the requirement of the due process
standard is not to exclude presumptively false evi-
dence but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the
tise of the evidence, whether true or false.
Id. at 236.
Following the enunciation of the due process standard
of fairness in Lisenba, the Court applied the standard in
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). The Court
held in Ashcraft that a confession obtained by means of
"inherently coercive" police conduct is inconsistent
with due process of law and therefore inadmissible. Id.
at 154. As the voluntariness rule evolved, the Court
adopted the concept of the "totality of the circum-
stances" in examining the voluntary character of con-
fessions. Thus in Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963), the Court defined the due process standard of
voluntariness as whether the defendant's will had been
overborne so that the confession was not made freely
and voluntarily. The Court stated that in establishing a
standard against which admissibility should be judged,
the question of voluntariness is to be determined by an
examination of the "totality of the circumstances."
Id. at 513-16. See also Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707(1967); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966);
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
"3 65 U.S. 534 (1961).
14 Id. at 543-44.
11 Id. at 540-41.
s The exclusionary rule forbidding the use of confes-
PROCEDURES USED IN DETERMINING
ADirssrBILrry or CoN'rEssioNs
Prior to the decision in Jackson v. Denno, the
courts employed three procedural methods to de-
termine the voluntariness, and hence the admissi-
bility, of confessions-the "orthodox" rule, the
New York rule, and the Massachusetts or "hu-
mane" rule. 7 Under the orthodox rule, the trial
judge has the exclusive responsibility of determin-
ing the question of voluntariness. Normally the
judge will conduct this determination in the ab-
sence of the jury.'$ If, after hearing all the evidence
on the voluntariness issue, the judge concludes
that the confession is voluntary, it is admitted into
evidence. Although the jury is not permitted to re-
examine the trial judge's determination of volun-
tariness, it may consider the probative value of the
confession. 9 If the judge finds the confession in-
voluntary, he must exclude it from the trial.
Under the New York rule, the judge initially
examines all of the evidence surrounding the mak-
ing of the confession. If he finds the confession was
made involuntarily, he must exclude it. However,
if the judge finds a factual conflict in the evidence
over which reasonable men could differ,-0 he must
admit the confession and instruct the jury to de-
termine the confession's voluntary character." In
sions elicited in violation of the warnings required by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), calls into
question the continued viability of voluntariness as
measured by due process standards. For it is not clear
whether the warning requirements of Miranda are sep-
arate criteria or are simply adjuncts to voluntariness.
However, in Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1968), the
Court indicated that voluntariness is still a relevant
concept, and in Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346
(1968), the Court suggested that Miranda might be
construed as only one element of the totality of the cir-
cumstances. Cf. Coyote v. United States, 380 F.2d 305
(10th Cir. 1967). But see 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (Supp. IV,
1968) (Congress set forth a test of voluntariness which
was intended to overrule the Miranda decision).
7 Not all of the states and federal circuits can be
neatly classified as following a particular procedure. In
some jurisdictions the choice ol procedure is left to the
discretion of the trial judge. See generally Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 410-23 (1964) (appendices to
separate opinion of Mr. Justice Black); Meltzer, In-
voluntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility
Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHi. L. Rxv. 317, 319
(1954). See also 3 J. WIGORE, supra note 5, at 585-93.
"8In United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 38
(1951), the Court held that if the defendant requests
that the trial judge excuse the jury, the judge should
grant the request.
'9 See Meltzer, supra note 17, at 320-21.
20 See 378 U.S. at 414 (appendices to separate opinion
of Mr. Justice Black).
2" People v. Fernandez, 301 N.Y. 302, 326, 93 N.E.2d
859, 872 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 914 (1951); Peo-




making this determination the jury is not required
to render a special verdict. If the jury reaches a
general verdict of guilty, it is assumed that the jury
found the confession involuntary and disregarded
it, or that it found the confession voluntary and
merely gave the confession its due weight in deter-
mining the question of guilt. The major difference
between the orthodox rule and the New York pro-
cedure is that under the former method, the judge
makes the final determination while under the lat-
ter, the jury makes the decision when conflicting
evidence is presented.
The Massachusetts rule combines both proce-
dures. The judge must make an initial finding as to
voluntariness, before allowing the confession in
evidence. Even when there is conflicting evidence,
he either rules the confession involuntary and ex-
cludes it from the trial, as under the orthodox view,
or admits in evidence those confessions found to
be voluntary. Nevertheless, before the jury can
consider the credibility of such confessions, it must
also find the confessions voluntary, as under the
New York procedure.22 Under proper instructions,
the jury is told to disregard the confession if it finds
it involuntary. Unlike the New York procedure,
however, the confession is admitted only when the
judge preliminarily finds the confession voluntary.
Therefore, under the Massachusetts approach, a
defendant is afforded two separate determinations
as to the voluntariness of his confession, one by
the judge and one by the jury23
In Jackson v. Denw124 the Supreme Court ana-
lyzed these procedural methods with regard to
fourteenth amendment due process requirements.
The Court expressed its approval of both the or-
thodox and Massachusetts rules.25 The Court held,
however, that the New York method, in permitting
the jury to determine questions of voluntariness as
well as guilt 26 without requiring the trial judge to
make a threshold determination of voluntariness
22 See Meltzer, supra note 17, at 323.
2s For extended treatment of the methods used in
determining admissibility and a thorough discussion of
the better procedure to be applied, see Comment, The
Role of Judge and Jury in Determining a Confession's
Voluntariness, 48 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 59 (1957).24378 U.S. 368 (1964).
2
- Id. at 378 n. 8.
26 Under the Massachusetts variation, if the judge
should decide to receive the confession in evidence, thejury also considers the question of voluntariness. The
Court, however, reasoned that this procedure would not
seriously endanger the defendant's right to a reliable
determination of the voluntary character of his confes-
sion. See 378 U.S. at 378 n. 8.
is an unfair and unreliable test which constitutes
a deprivation of due process of law.Y
THE RULE OF JACKSON v. DENNO
Defendant Jackson robbed a room clerk in a
Brooklyn hotel. During his escape, Jackson and a
pursuing policeman exchanged shots, killing the
policeman and wounding Jackson. The defendant
went immediately to a hospital where he was ques-
tioned by a detective. Jackson admitted commit-
ting the robbery at the hotel and shooting the po-
liceman. He was then given pre-operative seda-
tives. After the drugs had been adminstered, an
assistant district attorney began to question Jack-
son about the shooting. While under heavy seda-
tion, Jackson confessed to having shot the police-
man. At trial both statements were introduced in
evidence against Jackson. Defense counsel did not
object to the prosecution's attempt to offer the
confessions, but counsel did challenge the credi-
bility of the statements introduced by attempting
to prove the incoherent condition of the accused.s
Since a factual dispute as to the voluntariness
of the confessions was raised, the trial judge, fol-
lowing the procedure employed by the New York
courts, submitted the question of coercion to the
jury. The jury found Jackson guilty of first degree
murder. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed
his conviction.29 The defendant petitioned in fed-
eral district court for a writ of habeas corpus on
the grounds that his confession was involuntary,
and that the New York procedure violated due
process as a matter of law. The petition was de-
nied. 6 On appeal from the denial of habeas Telief,
the Second Circuit affirmed,31 but was reversed by
the Supreme Court.n
The majority of the Court in Jackson held that
171d. at 391. The Court explicitly overruled Stein v.
New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). In Stein the Court had
rendered a decision eleven years prior to its decision in
Jackson in which it rejected the claim that because the
New York method did not prohibit the jury from deter-
mining questions of both voluntariness and guilt, the
procedure violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. In Jackson v. Denno the New York
rule was found to "fall short of satisfying... constitu-
tional requirements" and Stein v. New York was over-
turned. 378 U.S. at 391.28Id. at 374 n. 4.
29 People v. Jackson, 10 N.Y.2d 780, 177 N.E.2d 59,
219 N.Y.S. 621, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 949 (1961).30 Application of Jackson, 206 F. Supp. 759 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
11 United States ex rel. Jackson v. Denno, 309 F.2d
573 (2d Cir. 1962).
32 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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the New York procedure violated due process re-
quirements because, in leaving the issue of volun-
tariness to the jury alone, the rule did not provide
adequate safeguards against a conviction being
based on an involuntary confession. The majority
reasoned that a jury might easily be influenced in
determining the voluntary character of a confession
by the corroborating evidence which supports the
credibility of the confession. The Court referred
to its decision in Rogers v. Richmondm and stated:
The reliability of a confession has nothing to do
with its voluntariness-proof that a defendant
committed the act with which he is charged and
to which he has confessed is not to be considered
when deciding whether a defendant's will has been
overborne."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the
New York rule failed to prevent the jury from using
an involuntary confession in reaching a general
verdict of guilty.3 5 The possibility that the jury
might disregard its instructions was inconsistent
with the due process requirement that a conviction
not be based on an involuntary confession." There-
fore, due process required some person or body
other than the trial jury to make an independent
and reliable determination of the voluntariness of
the confession after a full hearing.3
In disposing of the case, the Court remanded the
case to the district court with directions that the
New York courts hold a post-trial hearing on the
voluntariness issue, consistent with due process,n8
- 365 U.S. 534 (1961). In Rogers the accused was ar-
rested for robbery and was questioned by police about a
murder. The defendant confessed to having committed
the murder upon being threatened with having his wife
taken into custody. See also text accompanying notes
13-16 supra.
" 378 U.S. at 384-85.35 Id. at 388-89.
"'It is normally assumed that juries are able to
properly separate the issues given them under instruc-
tions by the trial judge. This assumption was repudiated
by the Jackson Court because of the disastrous effect
upon Jackson if the jury found the confession involun-
tary but disregarded the trial judge's instructions. Id.
at 388-89, 389 n. 15. Cf. Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123 (1968) (The Court reversed petitioner's con-
viction although the jury had been instructed to disre-
gard a codefendant's confession inculpating the peti-
tioner).
1 378 U.S. at 391 n. 19.
Is Id. at 396. Ancillary questions presenting potential
due process deficiences were not answered in Jackson.
The Court did not require that a voluntariness hearing
be held outside the presence of the jury. In a post-
Jackson decision, Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 (1967),
the Court held that no constitutional rights were vio-
lated where the trial judge conducted the voluntariness
or afford Jackson a new trial. 9 The final deter-
mination of conviction was left pending the result
of the hearing.40
THE RIGHT TO A JACKSON V.
DENNO HEARING
The Jackson Court was primarily concerned
with the procedural problem of insuring that the
inquiry in the presence of jury and defense counsel con-
sented to the evidence on voluntariness being taken in
the jury's presence. In dictum, however, the Court
noted that because a disputed confession may be found
involuntary by the judge, it would be prudent to con-
duct the inquiry outside the presence of the jury. A
lack of confidence in the ability of the trial judge to
reliably determine the voluntary character of the ac-
cused's confession has also been expressed. See Note,
The Role of a Trial Jury in Determining the Voluntariness
of a Confession, 63 MICH. L. REv. 381, 387-88 (1965).
Most notably, the Court failed to establish a stand-
dard for the quantum of proof the state is required to
employ in determining the admissibility of a confession.
See 378 U.S. at 404-05 (separate opinion of Mr. Justice
Black). In Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 (1964), a case
decided soon after Jackson, the Court continued to re-
main silent on the burden of proof issue. The Court
there stated: "[Petitioner] is entitled to a hearing in the
state courts under appropriate procedures and stand-
ards designed to insure a full and adequate resolution of
[the voluntariness of his confession]." Id. at 45.
The federal courts that have faced the issue differ as
to the appropriate standard to be applied in determining
whether a confession is admissible. Compare United
States ex rel. Lego v. Pate, 308 F. Supp. 38 (N.D. Ill.
1970) (reliable determination of voluntariness) with
Pea v. United States, 397 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(beyond a reasonable doubt).
For an argument that the due process clause should
not be interpreted to require that the trial judge be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the confession's
voluntariness, see Note, Criminal Procedure--Is Volun-
tariness of Confessions A Question For Judge or Jury, 43
TotL. L. Rav. 393 (1969).
(Editor's note: After this issue went to press, the
Supreme Court held in Lego v. Twomey, 10 BNA
Crim. L. Reptr. 3057 (Jan. 12, 1972) that the standard
of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt is not constitu-
tionally required in voluntariness hearings.)
19 378 U.S. at 396. Since procedure was being exam-
ined, Jackson was not automatically entitled to a new
trial. If petitioner's confession should be found involun-
tary at the state hearing, he would then be entitled to a
new trial. But see Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961), involving facts similar to those in Jackson,
where the Supreme Court failed to consider the possi-
bility of an evidentiary hearing in the state courts and
remanded the case for a new trial.40 Jackson v. Denno was the first case in which the
Court employed the device of vacating the judgment
and remanding for a hearing in the state courts. The
federal courts of appeals have followed the Jackson
standard of allowing the states to take the corrective
action by remanding for a state hearing in instances
where the petitioner has already been afforded a federal
habeas corpus hearing subsequent to conviction. See,
e.g., Minnesota ex rel. Holscher v. Tahash, 364 F.2d 922
(8th Cir. 1966); Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129
(8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966).
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voluntariness of a confession be properly deter-
mined before it is admitted in evidence. It is not
clear, however, if the Supreme Court in Jackson
created a constitutional right to an evidentiary
hearing procedure to suppress coerced confessions
in all cases. The Court stated:
It is both practical and desirable that in cases to
be tried hereafter a proper determination of vol-
untariness be made prior to the admission of the
confession to the jury which is adjudicating guilt
or innocence.41
The federal courts of appeals which have faced this
issue differ as to whether a defendant must make a
specific objection in order to obtain a voluntariness
hearing or whether the judge should conduct a
hearing despite the absence of an objection by
defense counsel. Three approaches have been
adopted by the circuit courts in determining
whether a particular case requires a Jackson hear-
ing: the permanent right standard, the absence of
issue approach, and the waiver theory. Of these
three, only the permanent right standard clearly
falls within the constitutional parameters of Jack-
son. The latter two approaches, the absence of
issue and waiver theories, are virtually identical
and raise substantial constitutional questions with
respect to affording defendant the right to a Jack-
son hearing.
Only the Fourth Circuit follows the first ap-
proach of affording the defendant an absolute and
a permanent right to a preliminary voluntariness
examination. In United States v. Inman'2 the Fourth
Circuit held that when a confession is offered in
evidence, an independent hearing must be held
even though defense counsel does not object to the
use of the confession nor requests a hearing.
The second approach-the absence of issue
theory-does not require a hearing unless the de-
fendant raises the question of voluntariness. 41 If
4 378 U.S. at 395.
42 352 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1965). Some states, as a rule
of administration, hold that it is the responsibility of the
trial court to sua sponte determine the admissibility of
the accused's confession. See, e.g., State v. Utsler, 21
Ohio App. 2d 167, 255 N.E.2d 861 (1970); People v.
Hoie, 33 App. Div. 2d 648, 305 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1969).
4 The petitioner is not entitled to a hearing if, upon
examination of the record, the voluntariness issue is not
in the case. See, e.g., LaBrasca v. Misterly, 423 F.2d
708 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Feinberg, 383
F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1967); Woody v. United States, 379
F.2d 130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 961 (1967);
Evans v. United States, 377 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1967);
Williams v. Anderson, 362 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 988 (1966).
the defendant does not raise the issue, the trial
judge is not compelled to examine the voluntariness
of the confession sua sponte. In United States v.
Taylor" the Seventh Circuit held that the trial
court may presume the voluntariness of the defend-
ant's confession from the fact that defense counsel
does not object to the introduction of the confes-
sion into evidence. The Seventh Circuit concluded
that the trial court need not raise the issue sua
sponte unless there are "alerting circumstances"
as to the defendant's emotional or physical condi-
tion which would require the judge to investigate
the need for conducting a voluntariness hearing.45
Some circuits, in applying the absence of issue
standard to cases in which the strategy of defense
counsel has been to undermine the defendant's
confession factually, hold that the trial judge is
not required to conduct a Jackson v. Denno hearing
sua sponte whatever the circumstances. In Lund-
berg v. Buckhoe-s the Sixth Circuit specifically noted
that defense counsel had introduced the confession
into evidence for the purpose of negating the ele-
ment of premeditation. The Sixth Circuit, den ing
the petitioner's request for a Jackson hearing, held:
Jackson does not require the trial judge to hold
a preliminary hearing sua sponte regarding the
voluntariness of a defendant's confession... ; it
merely deals with the procedure to be followed in
determining the issue when it is raised by objec-
tion or otherwise. 7
The voluntariness issue was similarly negated by
the strategies of defense counsel in Garrison v.
Patterson4" and Kear v. United States.
49
44374 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1967).
5 Id. at 756. The court stated: "Certain alerting
circumstances... may, under due process standards,
require a trial judge to investigate the necessity of con-
ducting a hearing notwithstanding the absence of an
objection." Id. The rule of United States v. Taylor
which denies an evidentiary hearing sua sponte in the
absence of "alerting circumstances" was confirmed by
the Seventh Circuit in United States "x rel. Lewis v.
Pate, 445 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1971).46389 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1968).
7 Id. at 157.
4405 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1969). The petitioner al-
leged, inter alia, that the trial court failed to determine
the voluntariness of his confession outside the presence
of the jury. The court of appeals reasoned that a hearing
was not required because there had been no objection
and "no circumstances existed to cause an awareness
that counsel was questioning ... voluntariness." Id. at
697. The Tenth Circuit found that the strategy of de-
fense counsel was to factually undermine petitioner's
confessions and not to challenge the admissibility of
the confessions before the jury. However, the facts in
Garrison may have been sufficient to place the volun-
[Voi.-63
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Other courts of appeals have adopted a waiver
theory to rationalize the absence of a Jackson hear-
ing in those instances where the defendant has
avoided challenging the confession. In Delaney v.
Gladden30 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that peti-
tioner deliberately waived his constitutional claim
under Jackson by failing to object or otherwise in-
dicate to the trial court that the question of volun-
tariness was in issue in the case. Delaney illustrates
how closely the theory of waiver resembles the
absence of issue approach and emphasizes the no-
tion that the right to a Jackson hearing does not
arise (i.e., is waived) if the question of voluntari-
ness is not brought to the trial judge's attention.
Similarly, where defense counsel argued to the jury
that petitioner's statements were the product of
drunkenness and requested the jury to consider
carefully those statements on that ground, the
Ninth Circuit held in Curry v. Wilson" that coun-
sel's strategy was an affirmative decision to waive
any objections which petitioner might have raised
under Jackson.
Under special circumstances, however, the fail-
ure of defense counsel to raise the voluntariness
tariness question in issue. These facts included a plea
of insanity, reference to a prior institutional commit-
ment, and cross examination by counsel concerning
alleged mental tests given Garrison at the time he
confessed. See text accompanying notes 57-58 infra.
4 369 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1966). In Kear v. United
States counsel objected at the outset of the trial to the
use of the confession on the grounds that defendant
had been denied his sixth amendment right to counsel.
On the basis of this objection the trial judge held a
pre-trial hearing and, after examining all the evidence,
iuled the confession admissible. On appeal, appellant
claimed that the lower court erred in failing to make
findings of fact pertaining to the voluntary character
of his confession. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and held
that defense counsel had not raised specifically the
issue of voluntariness at the preliminary hearing. The
court further concluded that counsel's questioning of
the issue of the defendant's drunkenness at the time
the confession was made was not intended to demon-
strate incapacity to give a voluntary confession but to
indicate that the defendant was not responsible for
what had happened. Id. at 81.
60 397 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1968), cerl. denied, 393 U.S
1040 (1969).
51405 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1968), ced. denied, 397 U.S.
973 (1970). Although counsel's strategy in Curry v.
Wilson illustrates the waiver approach clearly, Curry's
drunkenness was an "alerting circumstance" sufficient
to place the voluntariness question in issue. See Gladden
v. Unsworth, 396 F.2d 373, 380-81 (9th Cir. 1968),
where the Ninth Circuit stated:
If by reason of mental illness, use of drugs, or ex-
treme intoxication, the confession in fact could not
be said to be the product of a rational intellect and
a free will... it is not admissible and its reception
in evidence constitutes a deprivation of due proc-
ess.
issue will not exonerate the trial judge from grant-
ing a Jackson hearing under either the absence of
issuen or the waiver approach.-3 The court held in
Hizel v. Sigler5 that failure to object was not an
intelligent waiver under Johnson v. Zerbsi"5 and
Fay v. Noia.56 The evidence in the record indicated
that the petitioner was a chronic alcoholic, had
suffered brain damage therefrom, and was unable
to read or write. During the interrogation, he had
not been given his warnings under Miranda and
was intoxicated. The Eighth Circuit held that in
light of these "special circumstances" due process
requires the trial court to investigate, sua sponte,
the necessity of a Jackson hearing. 57 The court
reasoned that certain alerting circumstances, such
as the apparent physical incapacity or obvious
* ignorance of the accused, revealed the inadequacy
of counsel in failing to demand a voluntariness
'
2See United States v. Taylor, 374 F.2d 753 (7th
Cir. 1967); United States ex rel. Lewis v. Pate, 445
F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1971). See also text accompanying
notes 44-45 supra.
13See United States v. Carter, 431 F.2d 1093, 1097
(8th Cir. 1970).
54 430 F.2d 1398 (8th Cir. 1970).
"5 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Court explicitly held in
Johnson v. Zerbst that in determining the effectiveness
of a waiver of a constitutional right the test to be ap-
plied is "whether there was an intelligent relinquish-
ment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
Id. at 464.
66372 U.S. 391 (1963).
17 430 F.2d at 1401. The "special circumstances"
test of Hizel v. Sigler is a much more forceful approach
than that adopted by the Eighth Circuit in previous
cases. In Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129 (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966), the court of
appeals, per then-Circuit Judge Blackmun, found that
petitioner, a twenty-three-year-old Negro with only a
sixth grade education, had not waived the voluntari-
ness issue. The court carefully took note of all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the making of the con-
fession, of the absence of a personal expression of waiver
by Mitchell and of Mitchell's tremendous stake in the
outcome of the case. Id. at 141. Judge Blackmun, how-
ever, refused to decide the Jackson issue on either the
particular facts of the case or the absence of waiver.
After almost agreeing with the district court that the
observations of the trial court had met the Jackson
rule, a Jackson-type hearing was granted because of a
"mild doubt" that an independent state determination
had been made. Id. at 145.
In Minnesota ex rel. Holscher v. Tahash, 364 F.2d
922 (8th Cir. 1966), the Eighth Circuit again was not
forceful on the voluntariness issue. The court, also
per Judge Blackmun, indicated that the trial record
showed that the petitioner's confession had improperly
gone to the jury. Citing Jackson, Judge Blackmun
stated that, although trial counsel failed to object to
the confession's voluntariness, "a like fact did not
change the result in Jackson v. Denno." Id. at 927. Ab-




hearing and required the trial judge to investigate
the necessity of conducting a hearing."4
According to the absence of issue and waiver
theories, whether the petitioner is entitled to a
hearing depends on what the circumstances stated
in the record indicate as to how the voluntariness
question was presented at trial-was it waived,
was it not raised, was it raised in such an incompe-
tent manner as to be missed or were there "special
circumstances" prompting the judge to hold a
hearing sua sponte. As a rule of thumb, failure by
defense counsel to raise an objection to the volun-
tariness of a confession will result in the denial of a
Jackson hearing unless the judge is made aware
that voluntariness is an issue from evidence indi-
cating that extrordinary circumstances occasioned
the making of the confession. And even where such
circumstances are present, they are disregarded
where the failure of defense counsel to raise an ob-
jection reflects a conscious desire to deliberately
bypass state procedures and to ignore constitu-
tional objections which could be raised at trial."9
5430 F.2d at 1401. The Eighth Circuit applied the
"alerting circumstances" test adopted by the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Taylor, 374 F.2d 753 (7th
Cir. 1967). See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
For argument that incompetence of counsel should
not prejudice the defendant in attacking his conviction
on federal collateral review, see Developments in the
Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HAv. L. REv. 1038,
1109-12 (1970). See also Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d
129 (8th Cir. 1965), cert denied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966).
The difficulty with a competency of counsel standard is
quite apparent. The judge must determine whether the
defendant is capable of intelligently waiving the volun-
tariness issue when it is not raised at trial. The question
is: what type of conduct effectively indicates to the
court that the accused does not acquiesce in counsel's
waiver? Relief is most likely vested in the reviewing
court's interpretation of the circumstances presented
at trial.
5 In Curry v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1969),
counsel's strategy to permit petitioner's statements to
be admitted unchallenged did not preclude the trial
judge from noting the voluntariness issue. The dissent
in Curry, per Judge Browning, carefully pointed out
that' the state had conceded on oral argument that
defendant's counsel "argued the question of the volun-
tariness of the confessions to the jury; and the state
trial judge instructed the jury that the confessions
were not to be considered in determining appellant's
guilt unless they were voluntary .... " Id. at 120.
However, petitioner was not only not challenging the
voluntariness of the confession but was affirmatively
asserting that the confession was true and reliable in
an attempt to effectively impeach the prosecution's
case. This would appear to constitute waiver under the
rule of Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), for
failure to object to the confession for purposes of trial
strategy. See generally Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi
and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised
Doctrine, 1965 Sml'. CT. RLV. 187. Yet, it is question-
able whether the manner and purpose of defense
Affording the petitioner a Jackson hearing only
in those instances where he raises a specific objec-
tion or where the circumstances brought out at
trial alert the judge to the necessity for conducting
a hearing rests on the notion that the Jackson
Court did not intend that a sua sponte hearing
should be held whenever a confession is offerred
into evidence. Such an interpretation of Jackson
is not ill-founded. The primary concern of the
Jackson Court was to modify the rules of evidence
to conform to the requirements of due process of
law. Furthermore, Mr. Justice White writing for
the majority stated in the course of the opinion:
A defendant objecting to the admission of a confes-
sion is entitled to a fair hearing in which both the
underlying factual issues and the voluntariness
of his confession are actually and reliably deter-
mined.60
If the Court's language is strictly construed, it
would appear that those courts applying an ab-
sence of issue or waiver approach have complied
with Jackson. The statement suggests that a de-
fendant who does not explicity object to the use
of his confession foregoes the right to a voluntari-
ness hearing.
Nevertheless, in view of the factual situation
which the Court addressed itself to in Jackson and
in light of subsequent Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of Jackson, reliance on Mr. Justice White's
statement seems misplaced; there is strong support
for the proposition that the Court in Jackson in-
tended to make a voluntariness hearing a perma-
nent right, not subject to being invoked by a spe-
cific defense objection. The Supreme Court was
confronted in Jackson with a situation of no proper
or timely objection to the voluntariness of the con-
fessions offerred at trial and no request for a pre-
admission hearing. Despite these circumstances,
the Court held that the trial judge's determination
of the voluntary character of the defendant's con-
fessions was properly before the Court. Mr. Justice
Clark argued in dissent that the constitutionality
of the New York procedure was not properly before
the Court because it had not been challenged in the
counsel's conduct at trial can justify a conviction based
upon an involuntary confession. Certainly, under
fourteenth amendment due process, a particular act or
omission of petitioner's counsel without personal
participation by the defendant does not remove the
defect of an inadmissible confession. See Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 414-15 (1963); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 286-87 (1936). See also text accompanying
note 51 supra.
0 378 U.S. at 380 (emphasis added).
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state courts. 6 The majority, however, rejected this
contention and, while noting that Jackson had not
made an objection to the introduction of his con-
fession at trial, stated: "no one suggests that
petitioner... [deliberately waived his federal
claim]." 62 The Court considered a voluntariness
hearing to be of sufficient constitutional signifi-
cance to require the strictest standards of waiver.
Implicit in such an approach is that a trial judge
must grant a hearing unless the right to such a
hearing is specifically waived rather than grant a
hearing only when a confession is specifically ob-
jected to.
Such an interpretation of Jackson is reinforced
by the fact that the Court has applied Jackson
retroactively, 3 reflecting the Court's concern in
granting defendant a constitutional right to a vol-
untariness hearing. Also significant is the fact that
post-Jackson decisions require the state to show
clearly in its trial record that the defendant was
afforded a full and fair evidentiary hearing." In
Sims v. Georgia65 the Court ruled that the record
must show with "unmistakable clarity" that the
trial judge has independently concluded that the
confession was voluntary.
The Jackson Court's renunciation of an overly
technical rule of waiver is consistent with the prin-
ciple that the highest standards of proof are re-
quired in order to show that the accused has waived
61Id. at 424-25 (dissenting opinion of Clark, J.).
12 Id. at 370 n. I.
63 Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (1967); Boles v.
Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 (1964). See also Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967) (dictum); Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727-28 (1966) (dictum);
Linkletter v. Walker, 38! U.S. 618, 628-29 n. 13 (1965)
(dictum).
' In Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 (1964), the trialjudge declined to hold a preliminary hearing. From the
record it was unclear whether in overruling defense
counsel's motion to strike a police officer's testimony,
the judge had decided the voluntariness question one
way or the other, and if he had, what standard he had
applied. The Supreme Court, reasserting the position
it had adopted in Jackson v. Denno, stated that the
procedures were not "fully adequate to insure a reliable
and clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of
the confession." Id. at 45, quoting Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. at 391.
65 385 U.S. 538 (1967). In Sims v. Georgia the Court
remanded for a Jackson hearing where the record failed
to establish with "unmistakable clarity" that the trialjudge had independently concluded that the confession
was voluntary. Also, in Sigler v. Parker, 396 U.S. 482(1970), the Supreme Court, although not nearly so
forceful as it had been in Sims, required a hearing in
the state courts where it appeared from the trial record
that the judge had not made a preliminary decision on
the voluntariness question.
his constitutional rights. 66 In Fay v. Noia,67 the
Court carefully defined the concept of waiver first
formulated in Johnson v. Zerbst,3 a case involving
habeas review of a federal conviction. The Court
stated in Noia:
If a habeas applicant, after consultation with
competent counsel or otherwise, understandingly
and knowingly forewent the privilege of seeking
to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts,
whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons
that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-
passing of state procedures, then it is open to the
federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if
the state courts refused "th entertain his federal
claims on the merits.... A choice made by coun-
sel not participated in by the petitioner does not
automatically bar relief."
Thus, a failure to object that is "not the intentional
abandonment of a known right or privilege"' 70
should not preclude a Jackson hearing-it should
be meaningless by itself.7 '
The constitutional significance imparted to a
voluntariness hearing by Jackson and subsequent
Supreme Court decisions is supported by a number
66 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See gen-
erally, Developments in the Law, supra note 58, at 1103-
13; Lay, Problems of Federal Habeas Corpus Involving
State Prisoners, 45 F.R.D. 45, 55-67 (1969).
6372 U.S. 391 (1963).
68 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See note 55 supra.
69372 U.S. at 439 (footnote omitted).70 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The
concept that the defendant did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his constitutional rights under
Johnson v. Zerbst has been applied where counsel's
choice not to object was made under a state procedure
for determining voluntariness that was subsequently
declared unconstitutional in light of the decision in
Jackson v. Denno. See, e.g., Moreno v. Beto, 415 F.2d
154 (5th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Snyder v.
Mazurkiewicz, 413 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1969); Gladden v.
Unsworth, 396 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1968). However,
considering the Supreme Court's recent decision in
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), it ap-
pears that the deliberate choice of counsel not to object
to the voluntariness of his client's confession under the
state law existing at the time of trial will preclude Jack-
son relief absent any notice to the trial judge that the
defendant does not concur in counsel's waiver.
71 Such an approach was provided by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Black v. Beto, 382 F.2d 758
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041 (1968), where
the court strictly interpreted the waiver standard. The
court reasoned that defense counsel's cross examination
of the police officer who took the confession suggested
the possible presence of coercive influences. By in-
ference to Jackson the court held that the trial judge
should have been reasonably alerted to the fact that
counsel was attempting to place the voluntariness.
question in issue. Id. at 760. Cf. United States ex rel.
Singer v. Myers, 384 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'd on
other grounds, 392 U.S. 647 (1969).
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of practical considerations. The responsibility of
the trial court to determine sua sponte the admis-
sibility of the accused's confession facilitates fed-
eral habeas corpus review of state confession
cases.7 Such hearings permit federal courts to dis-
miss quickly and conveniently petitions presenting
frivolous claims for relief. Moreover, some states
by legislation have provided for pre-trial proced-
ures to determine the question of voluntariness.
73
A voluntariness hearing conducted before trial has
much to commend it.74 It would aid defense counsel
as well as the prosecution in deciding the case. Be-
cause a confession is such a crucial piece of evi-
dence, it may often determine the ultimate ques-
tion of guilt. If the trial judge rules the confession
inadmissible, there may be no need to hold the
trial. Similarly, if the confession is found admissi-
ble, the defendant may enter a plea of guilty,
thereby eliminating any proceeding to trial
5
Furthermore, requiring the trial judge to first de-
termine the admissibility of the accused's confes-
sion removes the possibility of disrupting a jury
72 If the essential facts concerning the voluntariness
issue are not preserved in the trial record, the federal
courts are impeded in any review of the constitution-
ality of the petitioner's claim for habeas relief. Faced
with a complete record of the voluntary character of
the petitioner's confession, the federal court can easily
dismiss petitions without a hearing if convinced of the
sufficiency of the record below. Effective appellate re-
view requires a clear-cut determination of the volun-
tariness question. See Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43,
45 (1964). See also Stidham v. Swenson, 443 F.2d 1327
(8th Cir. 1971) (Trial judge's finding that the confes-
sion was "not involuntary" as opposed to "voluntary"
does not comply with Jackson v. Denno); Wallace v.
Hocker, 441 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1971) (Trial court's
obligation is not satisfied under Jackson by a determina-
tion that the state has made out a prima facie case that
the confession was voluntary).
73 See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.190(i) (1968); ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-11 (1969); Micr. STAT. ANN.
Rule 785.5 (1968); N.Y. CODE CRm. P. §§ 813(f)-(g)
(McKinney Supp. 1970). See also State v. Keiser, 274
Minn. 265, 143 N.W.2d 75 (1966) (creating an analo-
gous procedure by judicial rule of administration).74 Compliance with the admissibility standards of
Miranda v. Arizona as well as the actual voluntariness
of the confession should be determined at the Jackson-
type heanng. See, e.g., Martinez v. People, - Colo.
, 482 P.2d 275 (1971); State v. Graham, 240 So. 2d
486 (Fla. App. 1970); People v. Costa, 38 Ill. 2d 178,
230 N.E.2d 871 (1967); State v. Utsler, 21 Ohio App.
2d 167, 255 N.E.2d 861 (1970); State v. Duckson,
255 S.C. 372, 179 S.E.2d 40 (1971); State v. Woods, 3
Wash. App. 691, 477 P.2d 182 (1970); Roney v. State,
44 Wis. 2d 522, 171 N.W.2d 400 (1969).
75 Nevertheless, state and federal collateral relief
may lie under state statutes such as N.Y. CODE CRI1.
P. § 813 (g) (McKinney Supp. 1970), which permit an
appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress in cases
resulting in a plea of guilty.
trial for the purpose of holding an unanticipated
hearing. 76
FL-RTIIER CLARIFICATION OF THE GRANT
OF HABEAs RELIEF UNDER
JACKSON V. DENNO
If the state employs a defective fact-finding pro-
cedure in determining voluntariness, Jackson v.
Denno permits the petitioner to collaterally attack
his conviction, in the federal courts.77 However,
notwithstanding the constitutional infirmity of
the state criminal proceeding, every federal habeas
corpus petitioner who alleges that his confession
was not properly determined to be voluntary is not
automatically entitled to a new hearing. In Pro-
cunier v. Alchley78 the Supreme Court recently held
that the failure of a petitioner to allege facts which,
if proven true, would establish the involuntariness
of his confession, bars a new hearing even though
the procedure used to decide the voluntariness issue
in the state court did not comply with the rule of
Jackson v. Denno.
The petitioner, Vernon Atchley, was convicted
of first degree murder and sentenced to death.79
76 An additional purpose served by a pretrial hearing
is that of granting the defendant an opportunity to
testify as regards his confession without being compelled
to take the stand in his defense.
The confession admissibility procedure adopted by
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State ex rel. Good-
child v. Burke, 27 Wis. 2d 244, 133 N.W.2d 753 (1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1017 (1966), is particularly note-
worthy:
In the interest of better administration of criminaljustice we suggest that whenever practicable the
prosecutor should within a reasonable time before
trial notify the defense as to whether any alleged
confession or admission will be offered in evidence
at the trial. We also suggest, in cases where such
notice is given by the prosecution, that the defense,
if it intends to attack the confession or admission
as involuntary, notify the prosecutor of a desire
by the defense for a special determination on such
issue.
Id. at 264, 133 N.W.2d at 763 (footnote omitted).
Special notice that the prosecution intends to offer a
confession in evidence is not mandatory, however.
Roney v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 522, 171 N.W.2d 400 (1969).
7 378 U.S. at 392. Of course, if the state has provided
an adequate post-conviction hearing procedure, a fed-
eral judge can more conveniently dispose of state
prisoner petitions. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336
1965) (suggesting that federal constitutional questions
be considered by the state courts before being reviewed
by federal judges).
78 400 U.S. 446 (1971).
79 The defendant was found guilty in a jury trial of
murdering his wife. Defense counsel had objected at
trial to the admissibility of a recording of a conversa-
tion between Atchley and an insurance agent, held
after the death of the petitioner's wife, regarding an
insurance policy on the life of the deceased wife. During
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Atchley sought federal habeas relief on the grounds
that his confession had been improperly admitted
into evidence and that the trial court had mis-
takenly excluded evidence as to his mental condi-
tion. The district court reasoned that the state
trial judge had not reliably determined whether
Atchley's confession was voluntary because "rele-
vant and perhaps crucial evidence on the issue of
voluntariness had been excluded." 80 Noting that
the procedure to be followed must be fully ade-
quate to insure a reliable and clear-cut determina-
tion of the voluntariness question, the court con-
cluded that the trial court's determination did not
appear with the "unmistakable clarity" required
by Sims v. Georgia." The court ruled that Atchley
was entitled to the writ unless the state afforded
petitioner a new hearing on the issue of voluntari-
ness.s2 The Ninth Circuit affirmed per curiam.s3
In deference to the determination of voluntari-
ness by the state courts,s4 the Supreme Court, re-
versing, reasoned that the federal judge had erred
in ordering a rehearing of those claims which the
trial court had fully and fairly adjudicated against
the petitioner. Rejecting the district court's plain
error approach of granting a hearing where the
state procedure used to determine voluntariness did
not comply with the procedural requirements of
Jackson, the Court stated that neither Jackson v.
Denno nor Townsend v. Sain"5 held:
the conversation Atchley described to the insurance
agent how he had accidentally shot his wife. The re-
cording of this admission was accepted into evidence
by the court over counsel's objection.
80 Atchley v. Wilson, 300 F. Supp. 68, 71-72 (N.D.
Cal. 1968). The court emphasized that evidence relat-
ing to the defendant's mental condition, whether he
was able to read or write, and the extent of his educa-
tion would all bear on the voluntariness of the confes-
sion. Id. at 71-72 n. 4.
11 Id. at 7.3 n. 7. See also note 65 supra.
32300 F. Supp. at 73.
1 Wilson v. Atchley, 412 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1969)
(per curiam).
4 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (Supp. V, 1969). The statute
requires federal judges to give great deference to state
factual determinations. Compare United States ex rel.
Dickerson v. Rundle, 430 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1970)
(strictly construing the language of the statute in up-
holding state's adjudication of voluntariness) with
Stidham v. Swenson, 443 F.2d 1327 (1971) (State
factual determination of voluntariness not supported
by the record).
55 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The Supreme Court in Town-
send v. Sain expanded the right of habeas corpus ap-
plicants to a de novo evidentiary hearing in federal
court. Townsend articulated the requirement that:
where the facts are in dispute, the federal court
... must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas
applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary
[Tihat an applicant for federal habeas corpus is
entitled to a new hearing on the voluntariness
issue, in either the federal or state courts, merely
because he can point to shortcomings in the pro-
cedures used to decide the issue of voluntariness
in the state courts.
8 6
The district court, while failing to determine
whether the facts set forth by petitioner were suf-
ficient to prove that the statement was involun-
tary, merely concluded that the trial court's ex-
clusion of evidence surrounding the making of the
statement entitled Atchley to a new hearing. The
Supreme Court indicated, however, that Jackson
and Townsend require the petitioner to show that
his version of the facts, if proven true, would es-
tablish that his confession was involuntary; other-
wise, a rehearing on the voluntariness issue would
be a futile gesture. Requiring the petitioner to
allege facts that would establish the involuntari-
ness of his confession will facilitate the federal
courts deciding habeas corpus petitions in dispos-
ing of the frivolous claims of state prisoners seeking
post conviction relief. Thus the Supreme Court is
providing the federal courts with a "pleading rule"
of sufficiency as an administrative guide in their
review of state confession cases.87
It is highly improbable that the Court's decision
in Atchley deprives the accused of the right to a
Jackson v. Denno hearing.n If the facts alleged by
the petitioner do not show that his constitutional
hearing in the state court, either at the time of
trial or in a collateral proceeding.
Id. at 312. For detailed discussion of the Townsend
standards see Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prismers: The Allocation of Fact-Finding
Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 923-85 (1966).
86400 U.S. at 451.
8 The Court's decision in Atchley is, perhaps, a
direct response to the critical problem of the over-
whelming number of state prisoner habeas corpus peti-
tions in federal courts. See generally Burger, The State
of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
18 Nevertheless, the Court seems to ignore the ra-
tionale of Jackson-that the trial court's failure to
provide adequate procedural safeguards in preventing
a conviction from being based on an involuntary con-
fession violates due process of law. The emphasis of
the Jackson Court in modifying the rules of procedure
used to admit evidence in criminal cases indicates that
it is by means of a full and fair evidentiary hearing that
findings of fact can best be articulated and that the
issue of voluntariness be properly determined. The
Atcldey Court avoids the constitutional standard of
Jackson in opting for quicker disposal of coerced con-
fession claims on appellate review. But see Hackathorn
v. Decker, 438 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1971) (Petitioner is
entitled to Jackson relief although facts were not al-
leged to support the contention that the confessions
were involuntar-).
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rights have been violated by the use of an involun-
tary confession, then he is not capable of suffering
a constitutional injury. The ruling of the Court
would seem to be an application of the familiar
principle that one is not entitled to relief unless he
alleges facts which would permit recovery if not
rebutted.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in Jackson v.
Denno that the jury may examine the voluntari-
ness question only after the judge has fully and
independently resolved that issue against the ac-
cused is consistent with enforcement of the rule
excluding coerced confessions from trial. Analysis
of the federal circuits' disposition of requests for
Jackson relief indicates that some decisions weaken
the Supreme Court's express purpose in Jackson of
protecting the defendant against the use of an in-
admissible confession. Some courts evade the Jack-
son rule by requiring the judge to determine inde-
pendently the voluntary character of the accused's
confession only where the question of voluntariness
has been placed in issue by means of a specific ob-
jection by counsel. Such an interpretation of the
Jackson rule is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's decision. A confession is such an immeasur-
ably potent piece of evidence that it may tend to
have a highly persuasive effect upon the jury, often
determining the ultimate question of guilt. The
right to a preliminary determination of the volun-
tary character of a confession should be made man-
datory and should not be outweighed by other
consiserations.
Jackson v. Denno suggested that failure to object
to the prosecution's attempt to offer a confession
in evidence does not waive the requirement that
the defendant be afforded an adequate and reliable
hearing. Furthermore, under the Jackson rule, be-
fore a confession may be introduced in evidence,
the finding of. the trial court that the confession is
voluntary must appear from the record with "un-
mistakable clarity." 19 The importance of a con-
stitutional right evidenced by "unmistakable
clarity," p lus retroactive application, would indi-
cate that the right to a Jackson v. Denno hearing
must be fully protected. Re-examination of the
Supreme Court's objectives in Jackson implies
that due process of law requires the trial judge to
act sua sponte in determining the question of vol-
untariness whenever a confession is offered in evi-
dence.90 It is only in this manner that a voluntari-
ness hearing will be a constitutional guarantee,
available to all defendants upon the attempt of the
prosecution to admit the confession in evidence.
9 Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (1967). See note 65
supra.90The Supreme Court currently uses the concept
"due process" as an independent device, ensunng fun-
damental fairness, for protecting the defendant. See,
e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Pate v. Robinson, 385
U.S. 375 (1966).
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CONTROVERTING PROBABLE CAUSE IN FACIALLY
SUFFICIENT AFFIDAVITS
In recent years the Supreme Court has dealt ex-
tensively with the development of criminal pro-
cedure.1 The fourth amendment, prohibiting un-
reasonable searches and seizures, has often been
the focal point of this development.2 Police obtain
search warrants3 by filing affidavits which purport
to show the probable cause required by the fourth
amendment. 4 It is well established that a defend-
ant may challenge the sufficiency of the affidavit's
allegations by examining the affidavit on its face.'
What is uncertain, however, is whether'the defend-
ant has the right to go behind the affidavit to con-
trovert its accuracy.
If the defendant were able to go behind the
affidavit to challenge its accuracy, the probable
cause requirement would be a more meaningful
I See generally A. BICKEL, TaE SuPREmm COURrT AND
THE IDEA Or PROGIYEss 7 (1970).2 Among some of the more prominent recent decisions
are: Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Camara v. Munci-
pal Court 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (19615.
3 Searches may occur without warrants. See, e.g.,
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). But if a war-
rant is sought, the police must submit an affidavit. This
comment deals with the problem of affidavits.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
I Kipperman, Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits
as a Ground for Suppressing Evidence, 84 HAnv. L. REv.
825, 830 (1971). The Supreme Court employed the
traditional analytical process of a reviewing court in
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). First,
it looked to the affidavit; second, it determined whether
on its face probable cause existed. The thrust of this
comment is that a third step is appropriate-granting
the sufficiency of the facts as alleged, did the allegations
accurately reflect the true circumstances? This factual
inquiry is what most courts deny a defendant. Useful
examples of traditional practice are also found in United
States v. Gianaris, 25 F.R.D. 194, 194-95 (D.D.C.
1960); Smee v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 488, 490, 251
S.W. 622, 623 (1923). The Supreme Court has applied
this approach to affidavits based on informant's in-
formation. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969); Agilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See
generally Mascolo, Impeaching the Credibility of Affi-
davits for Search Warrants: Piercing the Presumption of
Validity, 44 CoNN. B.J. 9, 16-17 (1970).
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protection of individual privacy and security.8
Letting him do so would help hold the police to a
high standard of accountability and curtail abuse
of "information and belief" affidavits. Such a
hearing could deter use of perjured allegations and
provide a safeguard to use of hearsay. Finally,
controverting probable cause reduces the odds
that an inaccurate warrant might produce a con-
viction.
To c6 ntrovert an affidavit's accuracy, the de-
fendant must in some manner prove that facially
sufficient allegations of probable cause contained
in the affidavit are in fact baseless. This comment
offers a procedural formulation for governing the
exercise of the proposed right which gives proper
weight to the competing interests of assuring the
existence of probable cause and of maintaining
effective law enforcement. The defendant must
first raise some doubt about the affidavit's factual
accuracy, preferably at a pre-trial hearing. If he
can cast doubt on its accuracy, he should then be
permitted to prove his challenge. The defendant
should have the burden of proof, with any doubt
resolved in favor of the affidavit.7 Should the de-
fendant prevail, his remedy would be suppression,
since by showing the absence of probable cause he
has demonstrated the evidence was obtained un-
constitutionally.8
TIE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF CONTROVERTING
PROBABLE CAUSE
There is no definitive authority deciding
whether or not a defendant has the right to chal-
lenge an affidavit's accuracy. In Rugendorf v.
United States the Supreme Court noted it
... has never passed directly on the extent to which
a court may permit [factual challenge of an affi-
6 This is the basic policy of the fourth amendment.
See note 15 infra.7 This formulation is in most essentials the one
employed in New York practice. People v. Alfinito,
16 N.Y.2d 181, 211 N.E.2d 644, 264 N Y.S.2d 243
(1965).8 He comes within the rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961). This decision extended to state courts
application of the exclusionary rule announced in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
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davit] when the search warrant is valid on its face
and when the allegations of the underlying affi-
davit establish 'probable cause.' I
The federal circuits have split on this question in
the absence of Supreme Court pronouncement
Generally, a majority of federal courts affirms the
defendant's right to controvert probable cause,
while a majority of state courts denies such a
right." Unsatisfactory analysis characterizes most
9 376 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1964). The Supreme Court,
however, interpreted the predecessor to Fzn. R. Cma.
P. 41(e), see note 81 infra-the Espionage Act of 1917,
ch. 30, § 15, 40 Stat. 229-to mean that a defendant
may controvert probable cause. Steele v. United States
(No. 1), 267 U.S. 498, 501 (1925). In Dumbra v. United
States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925), the defendant argued the
search warrant was issued without probable cause. Id.
at 436. The Supreme Court did not reach the con-
stitutional issue and confined its analysis to the affi-
davit's sufficiency. Id. at 437. The Court did cite Steele,
but not for its interpretation of the Espionage Act
provision dealing with probable cause challenges. Id.
at 437, 439.
The commentators of that era virtually ignored this
problem. For example, of the articles discussing search
and seizure under the Espionage Act, one of the most
thorough completely ignores the problem considered
in Steele, although it gives detailed attention to the
mechanics of the Act. Baker, Searches & Seizures under
the National Prohibition Act, 16 GEo. L.J. 415, 428-31
(1928).10 In one group are courts giving the defendant this
right: United States v. Dunning, 425 F.2d 836 (2d Cir.
1969); Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317 (9th
Cir. 1962); King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398 (4th
Cir. 1960); United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d 318 (7th
Cir. 1960). Another group reveals ambiguity in its
treatment of this asserted right: United States v.
Thompson, 421 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1970); Rosencranz
v. United States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966). A third
group fairly clearly withholds the right: United States
v. Bridges, 419 F.2d 963 (8th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Bowling, 351 F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1965); Kenney v.
United States, 157 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
"1 King v. United States, 282 F.2d 398, 400 n. 4
(4th Cir. 1960). See Note, Criminal Procedure, 15
BuF:rsAo L. Rxv. 712, 714 (1966); Note, Criminal
Procedure: Search & Seizure--Right to Challenge Truth
of Afidavit for Warrant, 51 CoizNz. L.Q. 822, 824
(1966); Note, Defendant's Right to Controvert a Warrant
Valid on Its Face, 34 FoRDHAm L. Rzv. 740, 740-41
(1966); Note, Recent Decisions, 32 BRooxz.LY L. Rv.
423, 424-25 (1966).
Included in the majority are the following state
courts: People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 258 N.E.2d 341
(1970); Bowen v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 400, 251
S.W. 625 (1923); Tucker v. State, 244 Md. 488, 224
A.2d 111 (1966); Ray v. State, 43 Okla. Crim. 1, 276
P. 785 (1929); State v. Seymour, 46 R.I. 257, 126 A. 755
(1924); Owens v. State, 217 Tenn. 544, 399 S.W.2d 507
(1966); Ware v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 90, 7 S.W.2d 551
(1928); State v. Shaffer, 120 Wash. 345, 207 P. 229
(1922).
Some of the minority courts are: People v. Butler,
64 Cal. 2d 842, 415 P.2d 819, 52 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1966);
People v. Burt, 236 Mich. 62, 210 N.W. 97 (1926);
O'Bean v. State, 184 So. 2d 635 (Miss. 1966); People v.
Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 211 N.E.2d 644, 264 N.Y.S.2d
243 (1965).
of the decisions, as the reasoning expressed often
ignores key policy considerations." Courts deny-
ing review of an affidavit's accuracy generally
seem to do so on the rationale that issuance of a
warrant is a judicial act in which the magistrate's
exercise of his discretionary power should be re-
spected." Courts permitting review usually do so
to safeguard personal security from police mis-
conduct.1
4
The fundamental issue-should a defendant
have the right to go behind the affidavit to con-
trovert probable cause-is a problem of constitu-
tional law. As such, it is necessary to look to the
underlying policy of the fourth amendment and to-
the Supreme Court's treatment of analogous prob-
lems under that amendment. The logic of the de-
fendant's position is dear. The fourth amendment
requires a showing of probable cause; without it a,
search is invalid. If the absence of probable cause
can be shown, the defendant proves the uncon-
stitutional nature of the search. Granting him a
chance to make this proof helps assure that
searches conform to constitutional standards.
But logic alone is not enough. The defendant
must also demonstrate that his position effectu-
ates the underlying policy of the fourth amend-
ment, which is the protection of individuals from
official misconduct. 5 Only if the defendant can
demonstrate the right would further that policy
does his logic take on meaning. Therefore, he must
make a convincing factual argument that without
the right to controvert probable cause, the in-
dividual privacy and security guaranteed in the-
fourth amendment are threatened.V 6
12 See Kipperman, supra note 5, at 829.
"3 Mascolo, supra note 5, at 18-19; Note, Testing the
Factual Basis for a Search Warrant, 67 COLUm. L. Rv.
1529, 1530 (1967). See, e.g., Kenney v. United States
157 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1946); United States v. Bru-
nett, 53 F.2d 212 (W.D. Mo. 1931); Owens v. State,
217 Tenn. 544, 399 S.W.2d 507 (1966).
" Mascolo, supra note 5, at 20-22; Note, supra note
13, at 1531. See, e.g., United States v. Dunning, 425
F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1969); People v. Affinito, 16 N.Y.2d
181, 211 N.E.2d 644, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1965).
"1 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528(1967). The Supreme Court has expressed this policy
in a variety of ways. In Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 392-93 (1914), the Court spoke of putting
public officers "under limitations and restraint." This
same thinking was evident in Sgro v. United States,
287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), this policy permeated the Court's opinion.
It considered the central meaning of the fourth amend-
ment to be securing "the right to privacy free from
unreasonable state intrusion." Id. at 654, 657, 660. This
no doubt expresses why the fourth amendment is con-
strued liberally in favor of the individual. See Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).6 The Supreme Court has referred to safeguarding
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The application of the fourth amendment l-
lustrates this policy at work. It is easy' to see the
process in the sweeping statements of a case like
Mapp. v. Ohio, which holds in favor of a defend-
ant.7 But decisions which hold in favor of the
prosecution have been more instructive. They
cautiously recognize that the interest of effective
law enforcement requires balancing the individ-
ual's interest in privacy. Several decisions deal-
ing with the probable cause requirement are il-
lustrative, for at the same time that they hold in
favor of the prosecution, they announce important
restrictions on police conduct.
First, in United States v. Ventresca the Supreme
Court declared the sufficiency of an affidavit
"must be tested in a commonsense and realistic
fashion" 18 in order to recognize the practical as-
pects of law enforcement. The Court did not want
to encourage police laxity, but instead felt:
A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing
courts toward warrants will tend to discourage
police officers from submitting their evidence to a
judicial officer before acting"
Thus, the defendant is better protected by en-
couraging the police to obtain warrants before
individual "privacy and security" as the goal of the
fourth amendment. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
Application of this policy has been particularly diffi-
cult because of the type of cases the fourth amendment
involves. Cases raising the probable cause for search
issue frequently concern narcotics and gambling
charges. People v. Mitchell, 45 Ill. 2d 148, 155, 258
N.E.2d 345, 349 (1970) (Schaefer, J., dissenting). This
issue arose with some frequency during Prohibition,
when defendants were charged with violating some
aspect of the liquor laws. Typical cases are: Schiller v.
United States, 35 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1929); United
States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219 (W.D. Mo. 1931); United
States v. Boscarino, 21 F.2d 575 (W.D.N.Y. 1927). This
makes resolution of the issue appear difficult as the
evidence seized leaves scant doubt about guilt. People
v. Mitchell, 45 Ill. 2d at 155, 258 N.E.2d at 349 (Schae-
fer, J., dissenting). The unsavory context should be
irrelevant. Constitutional questions often arise in such
circumstances. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Further,
the need for tough law enforcement should not infuse
"the administration of justice with the psychology and
morals of war." See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S.
747, 758 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). And of
greatest importance, the fact of "guilt" cannot be
conclusive in a system which renders inadmissible
evidence seized unconstitutionally. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. at 655. The issue is not culpability; rather it is
what type of search may produce conviction. That an
illegal search proves successful should not bootstrap it
to respectability.
17367 U.S. at 655.
Is 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
19 Id. at 108.
they conduct searches by making the standard of
proof the same for searches with and without war-
rants. Although a strict reading might have fa-
vored defendant Ventresca in this case by setting
him free, in the long run it would prove counter-
productive. This form of balancing is typical of
the Court's approach of encouraging resort to
warrants. 0
Though use of hearsay in informant's informa-
tion has been sanctioned since Jones v. United
States," its use has been carefully circumscribed.
Even if the informant's information sufficiently
established probable cause, his information must
still be corroborated by independent information
within the affiant's knowledge." Use of hearsay
was further refined in Aguilar v. Texas" and Spi-
nelli v. United States.A These decisions required
two elements for issuance of a warrant: that the
affidavit set forth sufficient "underlying circum-
stances" for the magistrate to reach an independ-
ent conclusion regarding the validity of the inform-
ant's information; and that the afflant support his
claims about the informant's credibility or the
reliability of his information. 5
United States v. Harris" raises new questions
about this area of the law. The Supreme Court
dealt harshly with the standard of proof that had
evolved under Aguilar and Spinelli, seemingly
altering its content." But it did leave intact the
two-fold nature of the Aguilar inquiry; it is still
necessary to test both the validity of the informa-
tion and the credibility of the informant. In Har-
ris, the Court first extended the Ventresca ap-
proach of realistically testing affidavits to the
hearsay situation." The Court next appears to
have altered the substance of the two Aguilar
tests. The first test is met when there is a "sub-
stantial basis" for crediting the informant's con-
clusion. 2 This can include the afflant's personal
knowledge of the defendant's past conduct and
character, as well as tips from undisclosed sources.
As to the second test, the informant's reliability
20 See Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971).
21362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960).
22 Id. at 269.
"378 U.S. 108 (1964).24393 U.S. 410 (1969).
21 Id. at 413.
ss 403 U.S. 573 (1971), noted 62 J. Camm. L.C. &
P.S. 485 (1971); 85 HA~v. L. Rxv. 53 (1971).
27 See 62 J. Cain. L.C. & P.S. at 486, 488.
2' 403 U.S. at 579. The Court reversed a lower court
decision that failed to treat "prudent" as the practical
equivalent of "truthful" for purposes of testing an
affidavit.
21 Id. at 581.
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can be established without any reference to past
utility or reliability. 0 The "likelihood" that the
recited events were within the informant's know-
ledge satisfies this obligation.
This sanctioning of hearsay evidence recognizes
the great value of informants in aiding effective
law enforcement.31 That its use is not unrestricted,
as Jones, Aguilar, Spinelli and even Harris in-
dicate, 2 reflects the balance struck between the
interest of effective law enforcement and the policy
underlying the fourth amendment-preventing
official misconduct.
Finally, in McCray v. Illinois the Supreme Court
permitted arrest and incidental search without a
warrant on the basis of an informant's informa-
tion.3' The opinion makes it clear that the police
conduct would have been illegal if it had not also
been sufficient under the law governing arrest and
search with a warrant; the police had probable
cause, since the informant's information met the
relevant Aguilar tests governing use of hearsay. 34
Although the Court held against the defendant,
the decision significantly refused to permit war-
rantless searches to be ruled by less exacting
standards than searches with warrants. Seen in
this respect, the decision resembles Ventresca.3
It cautiously recognizes the importance of vigorous
law enforcement while carefully accommodating
that need within the larger goal of the fourth
amendment's protection of individual privacy.
These cases illustrate that the Supreme Court
often strikes a balance between the interests of
individual privacy and effective law enforcement.
It is evident that when possible, the Court will ac-
commodate both interests; if that is impossible,
the Court will recognize both interests to the ex-
tent feasible. The analogy provided by these cases
is helpful for resolving the issue of controverting
30 Id. at 581-82.
"1 Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable
Cau'se in the Federal Courts, 53 CALIp. L. REV. 840(1965):
The informer is a valuable part of the law enforce-
ment effort, particularly in those areas of crime
where the premium is on secrecy and the outsider
finds it difficult or impossible to obtain information
and evidence.
Id. at 840.
"2 See Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause for
Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L.Q. 958 (1969). The
author discusses the restrictions placed on use of hearsay
and considers Aguilar sensible and the subsequent
refinement made by Spinelli confusing. For a discussion
of Harris, see Note, supra note 26.
386 U.S. 300 (1967).
34 Id. at 304.
36 See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
probable cause, since these same interests compete
with respect to it.
The test of reasonableness frames the balance
between the interests of effective law enforcement
and of individual security, for the fourth amend-
ment only condemns unreasonable searches. 36
Reasonableness is a matter of establishing proba-
ble cause, and the Supreme Court's analysis of
probable cause follows this balancing process. It
is clearly established that probable cause only
exists when the facts related by an affiant are suf-
ficient to warrant an inference by a prudent man
that a crime has been committed or is in progress.n
Further, only the facts disclosed by the affiant be-
fore the magistrate are relevant to this determina-
tion." This is to insure that searches are based on
facially sufficient affidavits, in accordance with
constitutional standards. On the other hand, the
disclosed facts need not meet the reasonable doubt
test required for conviction, 9 and the evidence
does not have to be legally competent for trial. 0
These are concessions to the practical needs of
law enforcement.
There is no easy formula for judging what is
reasonable4' since the Supreme Court has declared
that the standard of reasonableness is the presence
of probable cause.42 Further, the reasonableness
inquiry is a factual one.43 Thus, the existence of
probable cause is a question of fact that deter-
mines the reasonableness of a search. This is the
light in which the affiant's allegations are evalu-
ated.
Since reasonableness operates in light of what is
probable cause, and since reasonableness is es-
sentially a factual inquiry, that inquiry should be
challengeable factually. If the alleged facts are in-
accurate, probable cause does not exist. Denying
the defendant the right to go behind the affidavit
to prove factual inaccuracy in unreasonable, for
denial of that opportunity potentially labels an
untruth a "fact" that is capable of producing in-
criminating evidence. Permitting the defendant
the right to go behind the affidavit helps prevent
the sanctioning of searches without probable
"6 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 65.
11 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
Is United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 109.
31 Id. at 108.4 0 Id.
11 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63.
42 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 534.
43 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 33; United States v.
Rabinowtiz, 339 U.S. at 63; Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). Cf. Vale v.
Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30,36 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
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cause. This logic has the ring of common sense,
but it is only constitutionally compelling if the
defendant can prove that withholding the right
leaves room for official misconduct that is destruc-
tive of individual liberty.
CONTROVERTING PROBABLE CAUSE: A MEANS or
PREVENTING OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT
The defendant can offer several convincing
reasons favoring the right to controvert the ac-
curacy of an affidavit establishing probable cause.
The following five situations illustrate how the
policy of the fourth amendment may require the
use of a hearing challenging an affidavit's accuracy.
They suggest that withholding this right permits
official misconduct inimical to the individual
privacy guaranteed by the amendment.
The right to controvert probable cause factually
should first of all help hold the police to a high
standard of accountability, in accordance with the
fourth amendment's policy of preventing official
misconduct. The Second Circuit recognized the
importance of this consideration in United States
v. Freeman:
Such a procedure would diminish the danger of a
warrant issuing on an officer's good faith misjudg-
ment as to the reliability of an informant, as well
as dangers of police laxity or bad faith."
The cases illustrate the need for rigorous inquiry
into probable cause in order to hold police to high
standards. In People v. Butler"5 a deputy sheriff
obtained a warrant by claiming in his affidavit
that he possessed information from a reliable in-
formant when in fact he had crawled under the
defendant's house and looked up through cracks
in the floor. The affiant thus misrepresented how
information of illegal possession of marijuana was
gained. United States v. Henderson6 involved a
search for gambling paraphernalia. The affidavit
recited that defendant had a previous record of
lottery law violations. The district court sup-
pressed the evidence because the police had "mis-
takenly identified the defendant as another person
with the same name," and because the defendant
actually had no prior record.47 Both of these de-
"358 F.2d 459, 463 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1966).
45 64 Cal. 2d 842,415 P.2d 819,52 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1966).
46 17 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 1954).47 Id. at 2. The court permitted challenge of probable
cause although the District of Columbia Circuit does
not so allow. Kenney v. United States, 157 F.2d 442(D.C. Cir. 1946). The Henderson court did not re-
fendants needed a hearing to expose unreasonable
police conduct which failed to meet fourth amend-
ment standards.
A second consideration is that controverting
probable cause would curtail abuse of "informa-
tion and belief" affidavits. These do little more
than recite: "On the basis of information, I be-
lieve. . . . " 4 The issuance of such warrants de-
pends entirely on the afflant's credibility. If the
magistrate thinks him credible, his decision seems
justified and reasonable in retrospect because the
subsequent search happened to be productive.
The defendant would have no reason for challeng-
ing the decision if the search were not productive.
Thus, a productive end result is used to justify a
possibly unconstitutional means. The vice of in-
formation and belief affidavits, the difficulty of
disproving what a person labels his "belief," 49 is
well illustrated by United States v. Hood."0 There
F.B.I. agents stated, without giving their reasons,
their belief that two of three informants were re-
liable. Reasons for a third informant's reliability
were given. Neither affiant had ever spoken to one
of the first two informants, and only this inform-
ant's information actually placed the stolen prop-
erty on defendant's premises. 51 Despite the lack
of support for this informant's allegations, the
affiants' belief was held reasonable in the context"
-the informant had been correct. Thus, a suc-
cessful search excused an affidavit that was con-
cededly insufficient in key respects," simply be-
cause the afflants had limited their recital to
"belief."
Third, the defendant should be able to challenge
probable cause factually where he can prove the
affidavit was perjured. A lying affiant conceals the
absence of probable cause, though its presence is
fer to the Kenney decision, which is still the rule in
the District of Columbia. United States v. Gianaris,
25 F.R.D. 194, 195 (D.D.C. 1960).
Is This was the substance of the affidavit in Ray v.
State, 43 Okla. Crim. 1, 276 P. 785 (1929). The affiant
recited: "I have probable cause to believe and do
believe" that Ray illegally possesses liquor on his
premises.
9 Id. at 789 (Davenport, J., dissenting).
50 422 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1970).
51Id. at 743 (Will, J., dissenting).12Id. at 739.
6Id. Another reading of this case is possible, namely
that the insufficient reliability of two informants was
nevertheless sufficient to corroborate information
supplied by a third informant. This reading de-empha-
sizes the facts Judge Will noted in his dissent. Id. at 743.
At any rate, this case provides excellent illustration of
the pressures to validate a productive search when the
affiant recites his "belief."
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the necessary element for valid searches.5' In
light of the policy expressed by the Supreme
Court in Mapp v. Ohio, the New York Court of
Appeals has viewed preventing use of perjured al-
legations as the decisive factor favoring contro-
version of probable cause.5 5 This problem is well
illustrated by Jackson v. State,56 where the item of
the search, a safe, was known by the affirming
policeman not to be in the house where he said it
was. Furthermore, the officer did not reveal his
reliance on an informant. The defendant moved to
suppress because of the inaccurate allegations, but
since the affidavit was sufficient on its face, the
court refused to let him go behind it to prove fal-
sity, and thus to invalidate the search.6' In other
words, there was a distinct possibility that a per-
jured affidavit led to conviction.
Though prosecution for perjury might seem a
sufficient deterrent to this form of misconduct, as
a matter of fact it is not. This statutory alterna-
tive is not sufficiently reliable, and it does not
reach such problems as inaccuracy because of the
intent requirement. Illinois' procedure points up
both difficulties.u Criminal prosecution generally
may be begun by complaint, information, or in-
dictment.50 Perjury is a felony in Illinois,60 so its
prosecution must begin with a grand jury indict-
ment.61 Clearly, this remedy is only meaningful if
the state's attorney chooses to charge the affiant
and the grand jury concurs. 62 But this sets up a
conflict of interest since it is the prosecution which
"When a policeman is the lying affiant, a related
issue of official misconduct arises. This brings into play
the basic policy of the fourth amendment. See note 15
supra. The basic problem discussed in the text, perjured
affidavits, arises whether or not the affiant is a police-
man.
55 People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 186, 211 N.E.2d
644, 646, 264 N.Y.S.2d 243, 246 (1965).
56 365 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Crim. 1963).
5Id. at 938.
53 When that state rejected defendant's position in
a rcent case, it did so in part on the assumption that
the perjury remedy was an adequate safeguard. People
v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d 140, 144, 258 N.E.2d 341,343 (1970).
69 ILL. R v. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-1 (1969).
60 Id. §§ 2-7, 32-2.
61 Id. § 111-2.
62 It is the state's attorney who presents evidence to
the grand jury, and he, his reporter and other court-
authorized persons are the only non-jurors who may
attend grand jury sessions. For the grand jury to
conduct its own investigation, good cause must be
shown and the petition for appointment of investiga-
tors must be signed by the foreman and eleven otherjurors; appointment of the investigators then is discre-
tionary for the court. Id. §§ 1124-6. Thus for all practi-
cal purposes, the state's attorney determines what the
grand jury shall consider.
benefits from the perjured affidavit. Futhermore,
the Illinois statute covers only intentional mis-
representation.6' Similarly, the prosecutor gen-
erally has the power to block informations and
complaints. It is therefore necessary for the de-
fendant to be able to controvert probable cause in
order to deter use of perjured affidavits.
Fourth, the right to controvert probable cause
is a necessary auxiliary safeguard when affidavits
are based on hearsay evidence."' Since Jones v.
United States, hearsay furnished by informants
has been a permissible basis for an affidavit.'
Aguilar, Spinelli and Harris have refined the use
of hearsay that Jones permits," by requiring that
the affidavit set forth enough "underlying cir-
cumstances" for the magistrate to evaluate the
informant's conclusion and that the affiant sup-
port his claim of the informant's credibility or the
information's reliability. The dual nature of this
probable cause inquiry remains intact after Harris,
although the content of these tests appears
thanged substantially.67 Admittedly, these tests
are not easy for a court reviewing the magistrate's
decision to apply, so the opportunity to go behind
the affidavit before trial becomes critical in this
type of situation. For instance, if the affiant claims
the informant is reliable because of his past value
to the police, the magistrate ought to probe the
extent and nature of the claim of past value with-
out being prompted by anyone. Should the mag-
istrate fail to do so on his own, the defendant
should have the right to challenge the informant's
past value.6' Withcut such an opportunity to
63 People v. Bak, 45 Ill. 2d at 144, 258 N.E.2d at 343.
64 O'Bean v. State, 184 So. 2d 635 (Miss. 1966).
15362 U.S. at 271.
66 See text accompanying notes 21-30 supra.
67 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 413. These
tests of Aguilar were extended to searches and seizures
without warrants in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300,
304 (1967). See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying
text, which indicate the content of these tests may have
been changed by Harris, although the dual nature of
the inquiry remains intact. If Harris is viewed as a
weakening of Aguilar and Spinelli, this effect might
properly be an additional factor in favor of granting
defendant's right to controvert probable cause. Their
right would compensate the defendant for the reduced
protection when hearsay is used, since the laxity sanc-
tioned by Harris, making affidavits more subject to
abuse, needs a corrective-the right to controvert
probable cause.
6If the affiant claims the informant is reliable to
give information concerning gambling, and if the affiant
also claims the informant has proved reliable in the
past, someone testing reliability might want to know
such facts as whether this informant led to arrests or
convictions in the past and for what types of offenses.
If the informant had been used previously only in
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controvert probable cause, implementation of the
Aguilar inquiry is jeopardized."
The critical nature of this opportunity was
evident in United States v. Pearce.70 In that case
the affiant claimed he received his information
from an informant named John Pearce. The court
allowed a factual challenge to the existence of
probable cause.7 The defendant used the hearing
to prove that John Pearce had not in the past
proved reliable, as alleged, that no one in the
F.B.I. had known or talked to Pearce previously,
and that they therefore could not attest to his
reliability. In other words, the defendant showed
the lack of a reasonable basis for thinking Pearce
credible or his information reliable, so that the
affiant failed to satisfy the second Aguilar test
which requires a showing of credibility or re-
liability. Without the opportunity to controvert
probable cause, the warrant would not have been
quashed nor the evidence suppressed.
Finally, challenging the accuracy of the affi-
davit is a means of minimizing the odds that
negligent errors may produce convictionY2 Such
narcotics cases, however, his value in a gambling case
may well be doubtful. This example is prompted 'by
Chief Justice Burger's suggestion in Harris that recita-
tion of reliability is sufficient if the events are likely to
be within the informant's knowledge. 403 U.S. at 582.
11 O'Bean v. State, 184 So. 2d at 638. To reach this
conclusion, the Mississippi Supreme Court overruled
well-established precedent in its state practice. See
Mali v. State, 152 Miss. 225, 119 So. 177 (1928), re-
affirmed in Henry v. State, 174 So. 2d 348 (Miss. 1965).
To the court, this choice seemed obviously necessary
under the fourth amendment.
70 275 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1960).
11 Id. at 322. "That such a hearing was proper is
hardly open to question."
i2Kipperman, supra note 5, classifies three types of
inaccurate affidavits. The first, intentional misstate-
ment, presents no problem; suppression is automatic.
Id. at 831. With regard to negligent assertions, sup-
pression occurs only if the error is material. Id. at 832.
For a third category, innocent misrepresentation,
competent evidence should not be excluded. Id. at 832.
He argues that this third category is distinct from
the second because the police cannot operate with
perfect knowledge and because he finds the fourth
amendment does not proscribe inaccurate searches,
only unreasonable ones. Id. at 832-33.
As a desirable practical consideration, however, sup-
pression should result whenever the error is material.
Determination of material error hinges on a "but for"
test. When the warrant would not have been issued
"but for" the allegation, the allegation is material.
The harm to the individual through material error isjust as great in the third categery as in the second, and
it is the interest of the individual that the fourth amend-
ment protects. See note 15 supra and accompanying
text. In any event, the police should be held to a high
standard of accountability. See notes 44-47 supra and
accompanying text. Although it is true that the fourth
amendment only bans unreasonable searches, the stand-
mistakes do not result from the sort of official mis-
conduct that argues in favor of holding police to
high standards or from the use of perjured allega-
tions that conceal the absence of probable cause.
Further, this form of inaccuracy does not involve
the often inexcusably vague information and be-
lief affidavit, since the problem here is not the lack
of allegations, rather their inaccuracy. This prob-
lem is also distinct from the problems of hearsay,
which basically concern inadequacy rather than in-
accuracy. Saying that probable cause exists when
it might be established that that conclusion was
an unreasonable one to make subverts the purpose
of the fourth amendment, for the inaccuracy of an
important element of the affidavit indicates the
absence of probable cause. This form of negligence
generally follows one of two patterns.
The first type of inaccuracy involves erroneous
identification of the affiant. Identity is important
since the magistrate must determine the affiant's
credibility. The importance of this was shown in
King v. United States," where a Ruth Douglas had
signed the affidavit. When the defendant chal-
lenged it, the only known Ruth Douglas in the
vicinity testified she had not signed it. She was the
only person in a position to have made the allega-
tions establishing probable cause with reasonable
accuracy, and the affidavit was the sole basis for
the warrant.74 The government failed to produce
its "Ruth Douglas." 7 5 Without a hearing challeng-
ing probable cause these facts could not have been
developed, and defendant's conviction for violat-
ing the liquor laws would have been sustained.
The opportunity to go behind the affidavit, thus,
was crucial for exposing an error.
The second type of inaccuracy concerns errors
in the allegations. Burrell v. State aptly demon-
ard for measuring reasonableness is probable cause,
and that in turn becomes a factual matter. See text
accompanying notes 41-43 supra. In this respect, any
material error shows the absence of probable cause,
thus that the search was conducted unconstitutionally.
73 282 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960).74 Id. at 399.75 Id. A similar problem existed in United States
ex rel. Pugh v. Pate, 401 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1968). There
the affiant used a fictitious name and signature. Id. at 7.
As in King, the affiant's identity was a critical factor;
the court held it could not be concealed without violat-
ing the fourth amendment. Id. at 8. In Dixon v. United
States, 211 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1954), the Fifth Circuit
would not grant a probable cause hearing, even though
the affiant could not be found after being subpoenaed
and the defendant proposed to offer evidence denying
the affiant's identity. If there were error, the defendant
never had the chance to prove it.
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strates this difficultyY6 A key allegation in the af-
fidavit was that one defendant was in Baltimore
on certain days, since his allegedly observed ac-
tions there were a substantial part of the probable
cause showing.- Another defendant offered evi-
dence to disprove this point, and thus to show the
absence of probable cause. When she moved to
introduce this evidence, the court refused her a
hearing, relying on earlier precedent
7 that limited
examination of probable cause to the affidavit's
sufficiency." The first defendant was ultimately
convicted of violating Maryland's lottery laws on
the basis of the evidence seized in the search. The
conviction resulted even though she may have
possessed information proving that the search was
conducted illegally.
To argue that the fourth amendment requires a
hearing to controvert the accuracy of an affidavit,
the defendant must show that such a hearing ad-
vances the policy of the fourth amendment. In
other words, he must demonstrate that the hear-
ing is necessary to protect his individual liberty
from searches without probable cause. The five
factors explored in this section suggest reasons
why such a hearing may be necessary. It would
help hold police to a high standard of account-
ability, furthering the policy condemning official
misconduct. Similarly, a hearing may curtail
abuse of "information and belief" affidavits. A
hearing may be necessary to deter perjured allega-
tions. It also provides an auxiliary safeguard when
officers use hearsay to obtain a warrant. Finally,
controverting probable cause reduces the odds that
an inaccurate warrant may produce a conviction.
These considerations all demonstrate the impor-
tance of factually controverting probable cause
to deter searches that fall below constitutional
standards, since there is no other practical alterna-
tive.
Tnkt PROCEDURAL FoRaoULAr I N: A MEANs oF
PRESERVING EFFEcTIvE LAW ENFORCEMENT
Deciding that defendants should be able to go
behind the affidavit to controvert probable cause
does not determine how that right should be exer-
cised. The analysis of the policy question centered
on protecting personal security. A number of
courts, however, have raised several thoughtful,
78,207 Md. 278, 113 A.2d 884 (1955).
17 Id. at 279, 113 A.2d at 884.
78 Id. at 281, 113 A.2d at 885.
79 Smith v. State, 191 Md. 329, 335, 62 A.2d 287,
289 (1948).
practical objections to a right to controvert proba-
ble cause based on the valid competing interest of
effective law enforcement. These objections should
not defeat the right, but should instead govern its
procedural exercise. In addition, because proof of
factual inadequacy aims at suppression, the pro-
cedural formulation should not depart substan-
tially from current suppression procedure. 8
The determination of the affidavit's accuracy is
preferably a pre-trial matter.8' Such a determina-
tion expedites the handling of the case and elimi-
nates a special problem courts have found with
this area of the law. Courts in Texas82 and Ken-
tucky,8 when faced with motions to suppress dur-
ing trial, have felt that granting the right to con-
trovert probable cause creates confusion and
disorder in the judicial process, thus obscuring
the issue of defendant's guilt.1 A pre-trial sup-
pression hearing would avoid this problem, how-
ever, since the issue of guilt is not involved and
the only concern of the hearing is to determine
the single issue of a search's legality. 5
8
°See, e.g., FED. R. Cxmr. P. 41(e).
81 This is the policy in federal practice:
The motion [to suppress] shall be made before trial
or hearing unless opportunity therefor did not exist
or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for
the motion, but the court in its discretion may
entertain the motion at the trial o, hearing.
FED. R. Can. P. 41(e). The Espionage Act of 1917, see
note 9 supra, the predecessor to Rule 41(e), was similar.
The Supreme Court interpreted it to mean that the
defendant was permitted to controvert probable cause.
Steele v. United States (No. 1), 267 U.S. 498,501 (1925).
The Advisory Committee on Rules believes that Rule
41(e) "is a restatement of existing law and practice,"
with one exception not relevant to this comment. 18
U.S.C. § 3764. Although the Supreme Court holds that
defendant's right is an open question, see note 9 supra,
the Steele decision and the Advisory Committee's
position together suggest that Rule 41(e) could cur-
rently be used as a statutory grant of defendant's right.
82 Ware v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 90, 96, 7 S.W.2d 551,
554 (1928). More recent cases restate the Ware court's
conclusion. Griffey v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 338, 327
S.W.2d 585 (1959); Hernandez v. State, 158 Tex. Crim.
296, 255 S.W.2d 219 (1952).
83 Bowen v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 400, 401, 251
S.W. 625, 625 (1923). Kentucky continues to adhere to
this rule. Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 651,
221 S.W.2d 82 (1949).
8 See Bowen v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 400, 251
S.W. 625; Ware v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 90, 7 S.W.2d
555.85 Michigan has adopted such a procedure, and thus
avoids the practical objections raised by courts like
those in Texas and Kentucky. People v. Burt, 236 Mich.
62, 74, 210 N.W. 97, 101 (1926). Michigan is sometimes
mistakenly considered to have foreclosed such a factual
challenge to probable cause. See, e.g., State v. Seymour,
46 R.I. 257, 260, 126 A. 755, 756 (1924); G. THORPE,
PROHIBITION AND INDUSTRIAL LIQUOR 410 n. 37 (1926).
One federal court feli into this error, despite the author-
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A defendant should be required to raise some
doubt about the affidavit by use of extrinsic evi-
dence before any hearing is granted. What con-
stitutes "some doubt" is not easy to resolve. It
would not be the equivalent of a judge's suspicion
that all was not right with the affidavit. That is
really a matter of facial sufficiency, for the judge's
suspicion indicates only that the affidavit is in-
ternally inconsistent or so lacking in substance as
to be no more than conjectural. Basically, "some
doubt" must be raised by extrinsic evidence that
suggests the affidavit is partially or wholly inac-
curate in fact. Many of the cases referred to above
demonstrate what type and quantity of evidence
could raise some doubt, e.g., that the property
was not where it was said to be, as in Jackson v.
State,"8 that the defendant was not where he was
said to be, as in Burrell v. State,87 or that the origin
of the information was not as alleged, as in People
v. Butler.P All these examples indicate that "some
doubt" would be a question of fact.89
ity of Steele v. United States (No. 1), 267 U.S. 498,
when it used Thorpe's treatise as authority for denying
the defendant's right. United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d
219, 225 (W.D. Mo. 1931). This confusion likely results
from two factors: the special problem posed by Prohibi-
tion, People v. Oaks, 251 Mich. 253, 254, 231 N.W. 557,
557 t1930), and a line of cases concerning arrest instead
of search warrants beginning with People v. Lynch,
29 Mich. 274 (1874).
The Illinois Supreme Court relied heavily on deci-
sions from Texas and Kentucky for authority when it
denied defendant's right. People v. Bak, 45 Il. 2d 140,
143, 258 N.E.2d 341, 342-43 (1970). However, the
Illinois court disregarded the procedural differences
between its practice and that of Kentucky and Texas
at the time of the cited decisions, although the Illinois
suppression statute provides a separate hearing, much
like Rule 41(e) in federal practice. ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
38, § 114-12 (1969).86 See text accompanying note 56 supra.
87 See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
s See text accompanying note 45 supra.
s' A further difficulty with this standard is how it
would operate in conjunction with judicial discretion.
A judge would undbubtedly have some discretion to
determine when "some doubt" is shown to exist, and
discretionary acts are not reversed unless the discretion
was abused. See United States v. Haskins, 345 F.2d 111,
112-13 (6th Cir. 1965); Castle v. United States, 287
F.2d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 1961); Evans v. United States,
242 F.2d 534, 536 (6th Cir. 1957). Because of this, some
courts might be inclined to use the "some doubt" test
as a means for undermining the grant of defendant's
right to controvert probable cause. This is something,
however, that can only be determined with experience
as to how the right operates. Presently, there is no
empirical foundation for eliminating the "some doubt"
test because of potential judicial hostility. Should
hostility develop, this part of the procedural formula-
tion should be re-examined.
This test was first used in United States v. Halsey,
257 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Although the prob-
One consideration behind the some doubt test
is avoidance of routine use of hearings to contro-
vert probable cause.9 0 Requiring that some doubt
first be raised would tend to prevent going behind
the affidavit in every case as a matter of course,
whether or not it served any legitimate defense
purpose.91 Otherwise the hearing may simply be a
"fishing expedition" which wastes judicial re-
sources2 without advancing the policy of the
fourth amendment.
The requirement that some doubt be raised also
offers a measure of protection to police informants.
They may be used and their identity kept secret,
unless there has been a showing that disclosure is
necessary to assist the accused. 3 Jones, Aguilar,
Spinelli, Harris and McCray suggest that disclo-
sure should not be routine, since they provide, in
effect, alternatives to disclosure in analogous
situations. Requiring that some doubt be raised
should avoid routine disclosure. This would an-
swer the fear expressed by some courts that con-
troversion of probable cause would inevitably lead
to disclosure of all informants. These courts reason
that disclosure threatens police practice with a
dilemma: disclose, and destroy an informant's
utility, or conceal, and limit his utility to a
"lead." 11 The McCray decision, however, plainly
indicates that if disclosure is necessary, the con-
cealment privilege vanishes.95 A useful guide for
judging when disclosure is necessary would be the
some doubt requirement proposed here. In this
fashion disclosure would not become routine, and
the utility of informants would not be diminished
seriously.
In a hearing challenging probable cause the
defendant should bear the burden of proof. The
suppression remedy generally requires this of a
defendant, since he is the moving party98 and
lems raised in this comment were not considered, this
standard was approved in Note, supra note 13, at 1537.
90 United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. at 1005,
approved in United States v. Dunning, 425 F.2d 836,
840 (2d Cir. 1969); see also United States v. Warrington,
17 F.R.D. 25 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
911d. at 30.92 United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. at 1006.
93 See McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300,310 (1967).
"See, e.g., State v. Brunett, 42 N.J. 377, 385, 201
A.2d 39, 43-44 (1964). Decisions like this rest on the
implicit assumption that confidentiality is vital for all
informants. There is an obvious need for some con-
fidentiality, but it is pure speculation to hold the need
is so great that the defendant should have no right to
controvert probable cause.
95 See 386 U.S. at 310.9
6 Wilson v. United States, 218 F.2d 754, 757 (10th
Cir. 1955).
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since a warrant is valid until challenged. 7 The
Ninth Circuit has stated the general rule that the
defendant who seeks to suppress evidence has the
burden of showing the absence of probable cause. 98
Other courts agree with this general rule,99 includ-
ing those specifically extending the inquiry to
lack of probable cause in fact 10 Placing the bur-
den on a defendant appropriately respects the
prior determination of the issuing magistrate.101
There is no occasion for going behind the affidavit
after two judicial officers have already determined
its sufficiency-the magistrate in issuing the war-
rant, and the judge to whom the suppression mo-
tion is made--nrless the defendant bears the bur-
den of proof. Thus, doubtful cases should be
resolved in favor of an affidavit's accuracy. And
if the defendant meets his burden, his remedy will
be suppression of the evidence.j °
OTUnited States v. Thompson, 421 F.2d 373, 377
(5th Cir. 1970).
" Chin Kay v. United States, 311 F.2d 317, 321
(9th Cir. 1962).
9 See, e.g., United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 508(7th Cir. 1968); People v. Phillips, 163 Cal. App. 2d
541, 546, 329 P.2d 621, 623-24 (1958).
100 See United States v. Nagle, 34 F.2d 952, 954
(N.D.N.Y. 1929); People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d at 186,
211 N.E.2d at 646, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 246. Reaction to
this allocation of the burden of proof is mixed. It is
criticized as "a substantial barrier for an accused" to
overcome. Note, Criminal Procedure, 15 BuprrAro L.
Rxv. 712, 718 (1966). It has been praised as an effective
means of avoiding "overstrict rule" for construing
warrants, Note, Defendant's Right to Controvert a War-
rant Valid on Its Face, 34 FoannAi L. Rxv. 740, 746(1966), and for its consistency with the goal of "effec-
tive law enforcement," Note, Criminal Procedure:
Search & Seizure-Right to Challenge Truth of A ldavit
for Warrant, 51 CORNELL L. Q. 822, 825 (1966). These
discussions all deal specifically with the Alfinito deci-
sion.
101 See, e.g., Owens v. State, 217 Tenn. 544, 399
S.W.2d 507 (1966). This case, while illustrating the
point, grants the magistrate nearly complete discretion,
as Tennessee is a state denying factual challenges to
probable cause. See note 11 supra.
102 Suppression has been the federal remedy since
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The
federal rules for criminal procedure specify it. FED. R.
Cnms. P. 41(e). The Supreme Court extended the rule
to state practice in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
The exclusionary rule is coming under increasing
criticism, however. The most recent example is Chief
Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). He argued that
the only sensible rationale for it is deterrence of police
misconduct. Id. at 415. In that respect it has been a
failure. The rule was "hardly more than a wistful
dream," "conceptually sterile" and "practically" ineffec-
CONCLUSION
The right to controvert probable cause in fact
is only constitutionally significant because of the
policy of the fourth amendment. Its aim is to pro-
tect personal security from police misconduct." 3
That protection should embrace the right to con-
trovert probable cause in order to promote a high
standard of police accountability, to curtail abuse
of vague "information and belief" affidavits, to
provide a safiguard when affidavits are based on
hearsay, to prevent use of perjured affidavits and
to minimize the consequences of baseless warrants.
These factors reveal the necessity of using the
right to controvert probable cause as a means for
preventing official misconduct.
Objections to this right reflect the needs of
effective law enforcement, ranging from the pos-
sibility of judicial disorder to the problem of in-
formant identity. They show concern about the
practical drawbacks of granting the right to con-
trovert probable cause without limitation. When
properly evaluated, these objections help decide
the fashion in which the right should be exercised.
The procedural formulation outlined above seeks
to accommodate these objections to the policy of
the fourth amendment. The accommodation sug-
gested here should minimize the risks posed to
effective law enforcement. Affirming the right to
controvert probable cause factually advances the
policy of the fourth amendment. In light of Mapp
v. Ohio, any other result is inconceivable, so long
as there is recognition of the interest of effective
law enforcement.
tive. Id. Moreover, he argued the alternatives are
superior, id. at 420, such as his suggestion of a quasi-judicial remedy against the government for an officer's
misconduct. Id. at 422-24. See 62 J. Cotu. L.C. &
P.S. 480 (1971) for a discussion of Bivens.
A number of arguments have been advanced against
the exclusion of competent evidence, that it does not
deter misconduct, that the public interest suffers by it,
that the rule is overly technical, that determination of
"reasonableness" is difficult and that it encourages
police corruption and political favoritism. See generally
Peterson, Law & Police Practice: Restrictions in the Law
of Search & Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. RIv. 46 (1957).
On the other side it has been argued that the exclu-
sionary rule is effective, that other remedies are inferior,
that it is an essential safeguard of personal liberty and
that it promotes even-handed justice. See generally
Paulson, Law & Police Practice: Safegualds in the Law
of Seach & Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. Rv. 65 (1957).
103 See note 15 supra.
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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
FALSE ARREST
In Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir.
1971), the District of Columbia Circuit found that
a common law tort action and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
civil rights action could be maintained against an
individual policeman, his superior officers, and the
District of Columbia in a suit based on false ar-
rest and assault. Plaintiff's action against the ar-
resting officer alleged negligence in making his
arrest without probable cause and assault. The
court rejected the argument that the officer was
insulated from liability by the doctrine of official
immunity, finding instead that his actions con-
stituted a "ministerial" rather than "discre-
tionary" function.1 In reaching this conclusion the
court asserted that the distinction between "dis-
cretionary" and "ministerial" functions did not
rest on whether the officer was exercising discre-
tionary judgment in his actions, but upon an
examination of the precise function and a deter-
mination as to whether the officer's proper exercise
of the function would be unduly inhibited by the
threat of tort liability. 2 Likewise the court found
that the officer was not protected by official im-
munity from plaintiff's federal statutory claim.
The action against the precinct captain and the
police chief alleged liability based on their negli-
gence in the exercise of their duties to train and
supervise the arresting officer. The court ruled
that plaintiff's recovery under his common law
tort theory depended on whether defendants' ex-
ercise of their duties to train and supervise con-
stituted a "ministerial" or "discretionary" func-
tion; and, rather than reach this question, the
court left it open for the trial court to decide after
appropriate discovery.3 But the court asserted that
the officers could be held liable under § 1983 for
any negligent breach of their duties that may have
resulted in the deprivation of plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights.4 In reaching the conclusion that the
official immunity doctrine was not a shield to de-
fendants' liability the court relied heavily upon a
recent decision, Roberts v. Williams, - F.2d -,
(5th Cir. 1971), where a prison superintendent
1447 F.2d at 362, 366.
2Id. at 362.
3 rd. at 363-64.4 Id. at 365.
was held liable under § 1983 for injuries resulting
from a shooting incident because of his negligent
failure to train or supervise his guards in the use
of weapons. 5
The claim against the District of Columbia was
founded on the theory of vicarious liability for the
torts of the police officers and on the theory that
the District was negligent in its duty to super-
vise and control the police officers. The District
asserted its sovereign immunity as a defense
against these claims. The court, however, noting
that the arresting officer was liable for false arrest,
reasoned that no substantial threat to the effi-
ciency of government would result from likewise
imposing liability on the District.6 For purposes
of the sovereign immunity doctrine, the court held
that the making of an arrest was a ministerial
function. 7 As to the District's vicarious liability
for the police officials' conduct, the court felt that
imposition of individual liability on them would
necessarily also result in the District's liability;
but that even lacking individual liability, the Dis-
trict might be held liable if such a decision would
not impair its governmental performance. 8 The
resolution of this- question was left to the trial
court. Similarly the court held that'the efficacy
of the sovereign immunity deferise to the claim of
negligence in supervising and training the arrest-
ing officer depended on whether the District's
exercise of that duty was a "ministerial" or "dis-
cretionary" function. 9
The court also found that the District could be
held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 despite the
Supreme Court's ruling in Monroe v. Pape.'0 Lim-
iting Monroe to its facts, the court felt that 42
U.S.C. § 1988 provided authority for the conclu-
sion that local common law rather than federal law
governed the question of municipal immunity in
5 Shortly after the Carter decision the District of
Columbia Circuit extended the scope of its holding to
include prison guards. In Baker v. Washington, 448
F.2d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court ruled that a
prison guard could not escape liability for negligence
under the official immunity doctrine.
6447 F.2d at 366.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 367.
9 Id. at 368.
10365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Supreme Court in
Monroe held that the city of Chicago was not a "per-
son" against whom suit could be brought under § 1983.
Vol. 63, No. 1
Printed in U.S.A.
COMMENT
a § 1983 action. Futhermore, the court asserted
that the unique character of the District distin-
guished it from the ordinary municipality that had
been involved in Monroe. Thus upon proving a
deprivation of his constitutional rights--either by
the negligence of the District or the police officers-
plaintiff was entitled to recover under § 1983
against the District.
MARIJUANA RECONSIDERED
The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. McCabe,
- Ill. 2d -, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971), ruled that
the state's classification of marijuana under the
Narcotic Drug Act" rather than under the Drug
Abuse Control Act" constituted a violation of the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause.
The Narcotic Drug Act provides for a mandatory
ten-year prison sentence upon a first conviction
for the sale of marijuana, whereas the Drug Abuse
Control Act set the maximum sentence at one
year and permitted probation for a first offender.
The court's inquiry into the question of whether
any rational justification supported the statutory
classification led to its examination and compari-
son of the drugs included within each statute.
The Narcotic Drug Act embraced, in addition to
marijuana, the opiates and cocaine, while the
Drug Abuse Control Act included the barbitu-
rates, amphetamines and hallucinogens." Com-
paring marijuana to these drugs, the court con-
cluded that its properties and the effects of its use
differed significantly from those attending the use
of the opiates or cocaine and more closely resem-
bled those resulting from the drugs included
within the Drug Abuse Control Act." Among
other things, the court observed that marijuana
was not a narcotic or addictive, that it did not
cause severe physical ill effects, and that its use
did not lead to opiate addiction or to aggressive
or criminal activity."
The court dismissed two justifications advanced
by the state in support of the statutory classifica-
tions. First, the court found that the compulsion
to abuse associated with marijuana was relatively
mild and therefore distinguishable from the opi-
" ILx. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 22-1 et seq. (1969).
12 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 , §§ 801 et seq. (1969).
"3 On August 16, 1971, the Illinois legislature re-
moved marijuana from the Narcotic Drug Act with the
passage of the Cannabis Control Act, H.B. 788, P.A.
77-758. Under the new legislation, a first sale of a small
quantity of marijuana to an adult, as was the case in
McCabe, will result only in minor criminal penalties.
'4275 N.E.2d at 410.
"Id. at 411.
ates and cocaine which have a maximal compul-
sive quality.' 6 Second, the court rejected the argu-
ment that marijuana use often led to the use of
heroin.17 Therefore the court concluded that the
classification of marijuana with the "hard" drugs
under the Narcotic Drug Act, and the consequent
penalties arising therefrom, was unreasonable and
a violation of the equal protection clause.
PROBATION AND PAROLE RiGrrrs
Increa singly, questions involving probationer's
and parolee's rights have come under judicial
scrutiny and while recent decisions have appar-
ently settled certain of these questions, others
remain open. In United States v. Gras, 446 F.2d 7
(5th Cir. 1971), the court of appeals held that an
indigent probationer under an order suspending
final sentencing was entitled to appointed counsel
at his probation revocation hearing. The court
reasoned that since the defendant had never been
sentenced, the case was still open and he was there-
Tore entitled to his sixth amendment right to
counsel. The court's ruling comports with an ear-
lier Fourth Circuit decision 8 and a decision by the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.19 However, the
courts have not been prone to extend the protec-
tion of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule
to the probation revocation hearing. In Hill v.
United States, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1971), the
Seventh Circuit followed the lead of two other
federal courts 0 in denying the benefits of the ex-
clusionary rule to probationers.
The right of the parolee to a meaningful hearing
prior to revocation of his parole has garnered
significant judicial recognition as of late. In Bear-
den v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir.
1971), the Fourth Circuit ruled that the parolee
must be afforded notice of his alleged default and
the opportunity to present witnesses. This con-
clusion, the court asserted, was mandated by the
due process clause and considerations of funda-
mental fairness. In Carioscia v. Meisner, 331 F.
Supp. 635 (N.D. Ill. 1971), the Northern District
of Illinois likewise held that a parolee must be af-
forded a meaningful hearing which included the
16 Id. at 412.
'7 Id. at 412-13.
Is Hewett v. North Carolina, 415 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir.
1969). -
"9 Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 317 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Wis.
1970).
20 Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir.




right to confront and cross examine adverse wit-
nesses. The court relied heavily upon the Supreme
Court's holding in Goldberg v. Kelly,21 and the Sev-
enth Circuit's ruling in Hahn v. Burke," to conclude
that fundamental procedural due process guar-
antees attached to the parole revocation hearing
just as they did to the welfare termination hear-
ing or the probation revocation hearing.2 At the
state level the Michigan Court of Appeals in
Feazel v. Department of Corrections, 31 Mich.
App. 425, 188 N.W.2d 59 (1971) ruled that a
state statute providing for a revocation hearing
was meaningless unless the parolee was afforded
the chance to produce witnesses and evidence and
to confront the witnesses against him.
The question of a parolee's right to counsel at
the revocation hearing has resulted in considera-
ble conflict between the circuits. In Bey v. Board of
Parole, 443 F.2d 1076 (2d Cir. 1971), the Second
Circuit concluded that the due process clause re-
quires that parolees facing revocation have the
right to counsel. The court felt that the revocation
of parole involved a "presently enjoyed interest"
of the parolee-his conditional freedom7-that
could best be protected by a lawyer. 24 The court
stated that the presence of counsel at the revoca-
tion hearing should not interfere with the state's
administration of the parole system and was not
contrary to the state's. interest in the ultimate
rehabilitation of the parolee.25 The Second Circuit's
decision is in line with several other state court
decisions' and one earlier federal district court
decision, but it conflicts with the conclusion of
21397 U.S. 254 (1970). The Supreme Court in Gold-
berg held that the due process clause required a public
authority to provide a meaningful hearing for a welfare
recipient before it could terminate his public assistance
payments.
22430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970). In Hahn, the Sev-
enth Circuit relied heavily upon the Goldberg decision
in concluding that under the due process clause a pro-
bationer was entitled to a hearing prior to revocation
of his probation.
21See also Goolsby v. Gagnon, 322 F. Supp. 460
(E.D. Wis. 1971), wherein the court held that a parolee
must be accorded procedural due process guarantees
which included a meaningful hearing and counsel at
his parole revocation hearing.
2"443 F.2d at 1086-87.
26 Id. at 1088-89.
"1 Warren v. Michigan Parole Board, 23 Mich. App.
754, 179 N.W.2d 664 (1970), appeal dismissed,
Mich. -, 184 N.W.2d 457 (1971); People ex rd.
Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d
238, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1970); Commonwealth v. Tin-
son, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969).
27 Goolsby v. Gagnon, 322 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Wis.
1971).
the other circuits that had previously considered
the question. The Ninth Circuit has flatly refused
to recognize a constitutional right to counsel at
parole revocation proceedings.2 The Tenth Cir-
cuit has recognized the indigent parolee's right to
-counsel only if the state permits other parolees
the benefit of retained counsel."
Since the Bey decision, the Fourth Circuit in
Bearden also considered the question and concluded
that each case should be handled individually
without burdening the state with the strictures of a
firm rule.3 ' In addition, the California Supreme
Court in In re Tucker, 5 Cal. 3d 171, 486 P.2d 684,
95 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1971), recently held that due
process did not require counsel at parole revocation
hearings. The court felt that the prisoner was ade-
quately protected againgt arbitrariness, and it
feared that judicial interference with the adminis-
trative functioning of the parole system could
adversely affect the entire state penal system."
Likewise, the Missouri Supreme Court in Jones v.
State, 471 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. 1971), ruled that
parolees were not entitled to appointed counsel at
their revocation hearings.
VOICEPRIS
In Trimble v. Hedman, .-Minn.-, 192 N.W.2d
432 (1971), the Minnesota Supreme Court has be-
come the first state appellate court to hold that
spectograms (or voiceprints) can be entered as
evidence in a criminal prosecution." The court
restricted the admissibility of the spectogram to the
purpose of corroborating opinions as to identifica-
tion made by the ear alone and for impeachment.
After carefully examining the testimony of several
.experts, the court concluded that the spectograph
procedure had reached a point of scientific reli-
ability which justified its admission, at least for
limited purposes. Furthermore, although the pres-
ent case concerned a probable cause hearing, the
court asserted that spectograms were also admis-
sible at trial for the same limited purposes so long
as a proper basis was laid for the expert's testi-
mony.
" Williamsv. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1967).
29 Firkins v. Colorado, 434 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir.
1970) (per curiam); Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d
681 (10th Cir. 1961).
30 443 F.2d at 1095.
"195 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
3" Prior state court decisions had denied the admissi-
bility of spectograms. See State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343,
230 A.2d 384 (1967): People v. King, 266 Cal. App.2d
437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968). But see United States v.
Wright, 17 USCMA 183, 37 CMR 447 (1967).
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